Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendment for the War Powers by Dechert, Donald A, III
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 52 
Number 3 Spring 2018 
Spring 2018 
Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional 
Amendment for the War Powers 
Donald A. Dechert III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald A. Dechert III, Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendment for the 
War Powers, 52 Val. U. L. Rev. (2018). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss3/2 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 457 
Notes 
PERPETUAL WARFARE:  PROPOSING A NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
FOR THE WAR POWERS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), the United States of America has 
used its military as a bedrock of American foreign policy, leading some to 
claim that the United States remains in a state of perpetual war, which 
neither controlling political party—Democratic or Republican—seems 
willing to change.1  For instance, former President Obama used past 
military actions to defend his diplomatic stance in a diplomatic outreach 
to Iran.2  But his sentiments run contrary to post-Cold War sentiments:  
namely, war and peace are separate.3 
After the Cold War, the United States relied on its military as its 
foreign policy cornerstone.4  Its use of military power led to debatable 
actions:  (1) the Balkans; (2) Afghanistan and Iraq; (3) Libya; and (4) the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”).5  Instead of peace as the 
normal condition, the United States continues to rely on its military 
regardless of cost.6 
                                                
1 See Alex Emmons, Fifteen Years After 9/11, Neverending War, INTERCEPT [hereinafter 
Emmons, Neverending War] (Sept. 10, 2016, at 9:10 PM) https://theintercept.com/2016/09/ 
10/fifteen-years-after-911-neverending-war/ [https://perma.cc/EY3Q-Z6EM] (arguing 
that U.S. military engagement in the Middle East seems a perennial component of American 
foreign policy). 
2 See Glenn Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal, Obama Boasts That He’s Bombed Seven 
Countries, INTERCEPT [hereinafter Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal] (Aug. 6, 2015, at 8:15 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2015/08/06/obama-summarizes-record/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3SKK-3XJX] (noting that President Obama has defended such a diplomatic stance, turning 
to his bellicosity as justification for his toughness in this foreign policy realm). 
3 See HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 39–40 (1994) [hereinafter KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY] 
(writing before 1994 that Americans were “[a] people brought up in the belief that peace is 
the normal condition”). 
4 See Stephen Walt, The Broken Policy Promises of W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama, FOREIGN 
POL’Y [hereinafter Walt, Broken Policy] (Sept. 18, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/ 
18/broken-foreign-policy-promises-bush-clinton-obama-iraq-syria/ [https://perma.cc/ 
WUZ9-V5FV] (noting the mistakes of Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama and the 
contradictions among their promises, urging less interventionism at home, while pursuing 
abroad military interventionist policies). 
5 See id. (chronicling the military interventionism contradictions of Clinton, George W. 
Bush, and Obama and their failures). 
6 See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. Middle East foreign 
policy is akin to permanent war); Greenwald, To Defend Iran Deal, supra note 2 (noting 
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In 2016, Captain Nathan Smith filed suit against then-President 
Obama.7   Smith alleged that President Obama overstepped his 
constitutional bounds.8  But President Obama countered inter alia that 
Congress granted him power through the first Authorization for the Use 
of Military Force (AUMF), providing him with the requisite justification 
for military force in Iraq and Syria.9  
Smith sought declaratory relief, asking the court to call President 
Obama’s actions unconstitutional.10  Smith’s suit was quixotic.11  Although 
                                                
President Obama’s reliance on military action to justify diplomatic actions); Walt, Broken 
Policy, supra note 4 (highlighting the mistakes of Clinton, W. Bush, and Obama and the 
contradiction between their promises for less interventionism at home while pursuing the 
presidency contrasted with their interventionist policies involving the use of military force); 
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 3  (noting the belief that prior to 1994, peace was viewed 
as the normal state of affairs). 
7 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, (No. 1:16-cv-00843), 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution).  See also Smith v. 
Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (finding that Captain 
Smith’s suit is dismissed based on standing and political question). 
8 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(claiming President Obama’s use of military force against ISIL and reliance on the first 
AUMF violated the War Powers Resolution and seeking declaratory judgment).  See also 
Smith v. Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (dismissing 
Captain Smith’s suit on the grounds of lack of standing and political question).  
9 See Barack Obama, Letter from the President—War Powers Resolution Regarding Iraq, (Sept. 
23, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/letter-president-
war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq [https://perma.cc/L92Q-D5DV] [hereinafter 
Obama, Regarding Iraq] (declaring that the two previous AUMFs were sufficient authority 
for President Obama to undertake military operations in Iraq against ISIL).  See also Exploring 
the President’s Draft AUMF, NAT. SECURITY L. BRIEF OF AMER. U. COLLEGE OF LAW, (Mar. 1, 
2015), http://www.nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/exploring-the-presidents-draft-aumf/ 
[https://perma.cc/AL3R-JQC6] [hereinafter Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY] (discussing a draft AUMF dealing with ISIL proposed by President Obama, but 
to date never acted upon). 
10 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution based on President 
Obama’s orders of military action in Iraq).  See also Smith v. Obama, No. CV 16-843, 2016 WL 
6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (ruling that Captain Smith’s suit is dismissed based on 
(1) Captain Smith lacked standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint was not 
sufficiently concrete or particularized, and (2) that Captain Smith’s complaint raised a non-
justiciable political question). 
11 Compare Jens David Ohlin, The 9/11 AUMF does not cover ISIS, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 11, 
2014, 9:26 AM) http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/911-aumf-cover-isis/ 
[https://perma.cc/599K-38BF] (arguing that the first AUMF is not a blank check and does 
not cover operations in Iraq and Syria targeting ISIL), with Rebecca Ingber, The ISIS Lawsuit 
and the Perverse Effects of National Security Litigation, LAWFARE (May 13, 2016, 2:12 PM) 
https://lawfareblog.com/isis-lawsuit-and-perverse-effects-national-security-litigation 
[https://perma.cc/FKS7-H6PS] (arguing that the lawsuit by CPT Smith could perversely 
undermine the law and weaken checks on the President due to the nature of declaratory 
judgment).  See also Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (May 
5, 2016, 2:10 PM) https://lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional 
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dismissed for a lack of standing—or, alternatively, a political question—
Smith’s suit provides an opportunity to assess the use of the military, not 
only perpetual warfare but also complex policy implications thereof.12  
The War Powers Resolution and the AUMF create a permanency of war; 
as a remedy, the Constitution requires a new amendment, limiting the 
President’s war powers, by obligating Congress to advise, fund, and 
permit the President to use the military while reinserting the judiciary into 
war power decision-making.13 
Part II of this Note presents a background that explains how the 
United States declares war, the current problematic state of using military 
force, and the three branches of government.14  Next, Part III of this Note 
analyzes the problem, leading to the conclusion that a constitutional 
amendment is the solution.15  Finally, Part IV of this Note proposes a 
model constitutional amendment.16 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/UY8T-V2UK] (arguing that President Obama’s actions in Iraq against 
ISIL are unconstitutional); Marty Lederman, Why Captain Smith’s suit to enforce the War Powers 
Resolution won’t be a big deal, JUST SECURITY (May 9, 2016, at 8:42 AM) 
https://www.justsecurity.org/30949/captain-smiths-suit-enforce-war-powers-resolution-
big-deal/ [https://perma.cc/MMV3-NYP8] [hereinafter Lederman, Captain Smith’s Suit] 
(describing how CPT Smith’s suit will fail); Jack Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit Challenging 
War Against ISIL, LAWFARE (May 4, 2016, at 1:03 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
analysis-lawsuit-challenging-war-against-isil [https://perma.cc/H84A-J27B] [hereinafter 
Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit] (arguing that CPT Smith’s lawsuit will fail due to the political 
question doctrine and standing problem); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 
6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that CPT Smith’s suit deserved dismissal 
because (1) CPT Smith lacked standing and (2) that CPT Smith’s complaint produced a 
political question which is non-justiciable). 
12 See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in 
the Middle East seems to be a perennial part of American foreign policy); Walt, Broken Policy, 
supra note 4 (noting the mistakes of Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama and the 
contradiction between presidential pursuit of interventionist policies grounded in the use of 
military force while previously promising less interventionist policies).  See also Smith v. 
Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (holding that CPT 
Smith’s suit was dismissed due to lack of standing or alternatively on the political question 
doctrine); U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategy Conference Panel I -Is American Foreign Policy 
Overly Militarized?, YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
XvEfjzIQsy4 [https://perma.cc/296L-96DK] [hereinafter U.S. Army War College, 2013 
Strategic Conference] (presenting a debate between Dr. Daniel Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier 
in which both Professor Drezner and Mr. Frier agree that the U.S. foreign policy is excessively 
militarized and relies heavily on the military to accomplish U.S. foreign policy goals).  
13 This statement is the author’s opinion and thesis statement. 
14 See infra Part II (establishing the background, including declarations of war, the current 
status of the AUMF, the war powers of the three branches, and the process of a constitutional 
amendment).  
15 See infra Part III (analyzing the current problems with the AUMF, the pathologies of the 
three branches of government with the conclusion that change to the state of perpetual war 
will not emerge from the three branches of government). 
16 See infra Part IV (providing a model constitutional amendment to the War Powers). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
The history of the War Powers is how the United States came to its 
current position with its use of military force.17  To begin, Part II.A is the 
history of the War Powers from the founding until the modern day, and 
the change after WWII from an interbranch decision, vice an interagency 
to use military force or declare war.18  Then, Part II.B comprises how the 
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches contribute to the current 
state of affairs.19  Finally, Part II.C surveys the implications and the process 
of amending the U.S. Constitution.20   
A. Historical Synopsis of the War Powers:  How the United States Got Here 
Part II.A.1 describes the history of declarations of war.21  Part II.A.2 
presents the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and its aftermath, the War Powers 
Resolution.22  Part II.A.3 brings the reader to the modern era after 9/11 to 
the present day.23 
                                                
17 See supra Part II (describing the historical background of how the United States uses its 
military and got to the current legal status of today, looking at the three branches of 
government and their actions related to the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, and 
concluding with an overview of the policy implications and the process to amend the U.S. 
Constitution). 
18 See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the pre-WWII history of the use of military force).  See also 
STEPHEN GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 17 (2013) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, LONG 
WARS] (coining the term “interbranch” to describe the dialogue between the Legislative and 
Executive Branches, which characterized the use of military force and declarations of war 
and made the distinction between the previous interbranch deliberation process and the 
interagency deliberation as decided within the Executive Branch); infra Part II.A.2 (detailing 
the emergence of the War Powers Resolution in the wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution); 
infra Part II.A.3 (presenting the modern era and the AUMFs in the wake of 9/11 and the War 
on Terror with the AUMF’s subsequent allowance of military force as an interagency 
decision while departing from the historical interbranch experience). 
19 See infra Part II.B (sketching the background of the Judicial, Legislative, and Executive 
Branches and their relation to the War Powers Resolution and War Powers).  
20 See infra Part II.C (discussing the policy implications of the current legal status and 
recounting the process of amending the U.S. Constitution). 
21  See infra Part II.A.1 (outlining the historical basis of the constitutional War Powers and 
the acts of Congress to declare war). 
22  See infra Part II.A.2 (outlining the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution for the Vietnam War and 
its aftermath of the War Powers Resolution). 
23  See infra Part II.A.3 (outlining the AUMF and the War on Terror). 
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1. Declaring War 
Prior to WWII, the United States made formal declarations of war.24  
The Constitution created an interbranch system for its war powers.25  The 
Constitution vested the Executive Branch with the powers of 
Commander-in-Chief; however, it also vested the Legislative Branch with 
the authority to declare war and to appropriate funds for war.26  While 
some have argued that the phrase “to declare war” does not mean starting 
a war, historically, the use of military force remained a Congressional 
prerogative.27  Military regulations have served as an example of power-
sharing between the two Branches.28 
Past Congressional war declarations authorized the President to 
conduct war.29  Most declarations of war contained boilerplate language 
                                                
24  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war).  See also 
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (opining that the Cold War produced a change 
from formal declarations of war). 
25 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting to Congress the plenary power to declare war); 
id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e. that Congress votes to fund 
military operations); id. § 2, cl. 1 (naming the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting the division of war powers 
in the Constitution).  
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the sole power to declare war); id. 
§ 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate funding for war); id. § 2, cl. 1 (making 
the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (describing the President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief as a supreme 
commander but unable to declare war compared with the King of Britain).  See also GRIFFIN, 
LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 5–6 (noting the interbranch division of the war powers in the 
Constitution).  Thus both branches, per the Constitution, are heavily involved in the use of 
military force.  Id. 
27 See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AFTER 9/11, 144–52 (2005) [hereinafter YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11] (arguing that the original 
textual meaning of “declare” which allows Congress to declare war should not be taken to 
mean that Congress initiates war).  But see The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668–75 (1862) 
(noting in the dissent that “[b]y the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to declare a 
national or foreign war” while also noting the powers of the President for defensive action); 
Jennifer K. Elsea & Matthew C. Weed, Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use of 
Military Force:  Historical Background and Legal Implications, CONG. RES. SERV. (Apr. 18, 2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31133.pdf [http://perma.cc/8YMZ-STW9] [hereinafter 
Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War] (providing the historical declarations of war by the United 
States, all of which are constitutional declarations detailing duration, distinct powers, and 
funding and direction to the President, and containing the Declaration of War on Mexico of 
1846 which has nine separate sections detailing grants of power to the President for specific 
purposes). 
28 See generally Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 556–58 (1897) (holding that the 
President as Executive controls the military while Congress controls military regulations and 
legislates military regulations); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1981) (holding that 
Congress has the constitutional power to rule and regulate the military). 
29 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (granting the President the authority of Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces); Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (listing the 
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such as:  “[the] President is hereby authorized and directed to employ [all 
U.S.] naval and military forces . . . and the [country’s] resources . . . to 
carry on war . . . to bring the conflict to a successful termination, [and that 
Congress pledges] all of the [nation’s] resources.”30  This system worked 
well until WWII, when Congress issued its last declaration of war.31  The 
system then changed, moving from an interbranch decision-making 
process to an interagency process subordinating military force within a 
foreign policy system under the Executive Branch.32  Subsequent legal 
changes happened, such as the National Security Act of 1947; this Act set 
the stage for the use of military force throughout the Cold War.33 
2.  The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the War Powers Resolution 
The new interagency decision-making framework existed throughout 
the Vietnam War under President Johnson.34  During the Vietnam War, 
                                                
historical declarations of war by the United States as voted as joint resolutions by Congress 
empowering the President to pursue military and strategic action).  The historical 
declarations of war by the United States are all constitutional declarations detailing duration 
and authority to the President to carry out a war to its termination, such as the Declaration 
of War against Germany in 1917 or the Declaration of War against Spain in 1898, both of 
which outline the forces to be used by the President and that the President should seek 
termination of the war. Id.  When the United States declared war on Mexico, Congress’ 
declaration micromanaged the war effort while other declarations simply denoted the enemy 
and empowered the President to reach victory. Id. 
30  See Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (providing the boilerplate language 
of multiple declarations of war ranging from the Spanish-American War, WWI, and WWII). 
31 See id. (providing the historical declarations of war by the United States which are all 
constitutional declarations by Congress detailing duration, distinct powers, and funding and 
direction to the President); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from 
interbranch decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President 
to an interagency decision after 1945, leading to problematic conclusions and a dearth of 
outright victories compared to prior to 1945). 
32 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) (holding 
that the President is the constitutional representative of the United States for foreign affairs, 
and that his decisions, pursuant to legislative directive, are at the highest trough when 
scrutinized); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from interbranch 
decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President to an 
interagency decision under the Executive Branch after 1945); id. at 63–64 (describing the 
incorporation after President Truman of the precedence of Curtiss-Wright as a mainstay of 
subsuming the war powers within the Executive’s powers of foreign policy). 
33 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 100–02 (outlining the National Security Act 
of 1947, which established the structure of the Department of Defense and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Executive Branch).  The National Security Act of 1947 
reorganized the War Department into the Department of Defense, founded the CIA, and 
created the National Security Council under the Executive Branch, setting the stage for the 
use of military force under an interagency deliberation system.  Id. 
34 See id. at 121 (noting that the post-WWII National Security Act of 1947 apparently 
endowed the President, as Executive, with control of nuclear and covert action and implied 
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Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.35  President Johnson 
viewed this resolution as Congress’ concession to his prosecution of the 
Vietnam War.36  With the resolution, Congress essentially dealt President 
Johnson a blank check to use the military.37  When Congress repealed the 
resolution, President Nixon relied on military appropriations, vice 
Congressional authorization.38  In the end, the Vietnam War proved a 
failure, and Congress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, bypassing 
President Nixon’s veto power with the War Powers Resolution.39 
The War Powers Resolution intended a return to an interbranch 
deliberation on deploying the military.40  The resolution requires the 
                                                
that the President controlled the use of the military, which was then used by President 
Johnson). 
35 See Gulf Of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88–408, 78 Stat. 384, Aug. 10, 1964 (enacted 
but later repealed, authorizing the President to conduct war in Indochina and pursue the 
Vietnam War). See also H.R. MCMASTERS, DERELICTION OF DUTY 126–36 (1997) (noting 
President Johnson’s process, via U.S. naval patrols in Vietnam, to convince Congress to pass 
the resolution, providing Johnson authority to conduct the Vietnam War). 
36 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 122–26 (outlining President Johnson’s views 
that his actions and decisions in the Vietnam War were part of his plenary powers and did 
not require Congressional permission to pursue the Vietnam War). 
37 See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1041–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution and subsequent financial appropriations for the Vietnam War equated to 
Congressional approval).  A concurring judge in Laird noted the following:  “[i]n light of the 
adoption by Congress of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and the clear evidence of continuing 
and distinctly expressed participation by the legislative branch in the prosecution of the war, 
I agree that the judgments below must be affirmed.” Id. at 1044.  See also REBECCA U. THORPE, 
THE AMERICAN WARFARE STATE 133–38 (2014) [hereinafter THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE 
STATE] (noting that Congress continued to fund the Vietnam War and that budget gimmicks 
and Congressional abdication allowed President Nixon to continue his secret bombing 
campaign in Cambodia). 
38 See THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37, at 133–38 (explaining how 
President Nixon, moving beyond the precedents left to him by President Johnson, continued 
a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia, even in the face of Congressional disapproval 
when he relied upon Congressional appropriations to the Department of Defense to fund his 
use of the military in Cambodia). 
39 See Laird, 443 F.2d at 1042 (noting the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution).  See also 
THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37, at 133–38 (outlining not only the blank 
check to President Johnson and then the passage of the War Powers Resolution to retract 
such allowances and constrain free-wielding action by the Executive to conduct military 
action but also that Congress overrode President Nixon’s veto). 
40 See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (containing the War 
Powers Resolution of 1973, setting limits which the President must follow for ordering 
military force).  See also War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) 
(“[i]t is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the Farmers [sic] of the 
Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress 
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into 
hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated 
by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such 
situations”). 
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President to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours after 
inserting U.S. Armed Forces into hostile terrain or into areas with 
impending hostilities without a declaration of war; furthermore, absent 
Congressional authorization, U.S. military forces must withdraw within 
sixty days, with a possible extension of thirty days in times of impending 
danger during withdraw.41  Thus, the 148th Congress envisioned the War 
Powers Resolution as a return to the original constitutional intent of the 
Founding Forefathers.42   
Commentators have questioned the War Powers Resolution.43  The 
Department of Justice (DOJ), through its Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
has provided various opinions on the resolution.44  Presidents also resisted 
compliance with the resolution.45  And even members of Congress have 
questioned the resolution, with multiple unsuccessful attempts to repeal 
it.46  Meanwhile, some Congressional members have suggested 
                                                
41 See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (stating that Congress 
could approve extensions to the use of military force if done under sudden response of the 
President and presenting limitations on the Presidential use of military force absent a 
declaration of war). 
42 See supra note 40 (outlining the legislative intent of the War Powers Resolution).  
43 See, e.g., JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND 353 (2009) [hereinafter YOO, CRISIS AND 
COMMAND] (questioning the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution because it 
encroaches on the Executive’s authority).  See also generally Eugene V. Rostow, Once More 
unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (decrying 
the War Powers Resolution as a mistaken reaction to the Vietnam War and unable to codify 
an essential political question). 
44 See infra note 111 (collecting various O.L.C. opinions that enable the President to use 
military force based on argued exceptions to the War Powers Resolution).  Compare GRIFFIN, 
LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 204 (questioning Yoo’s claim that the Executive Branch has 
resisted adherence to the War Powers Resolution), with YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND, supra 
note 43, at 353 (arguing that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional encroachment 
on the Executive’s authority and plenary powers by an act of Congress). 
45 See Nolan Walters, War Powers Resolution a Failure, Senators Say in Suggesting Changes, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (May 20, 1998), http://articles.philly.com/1988-05-20/news/ 
26263790_1_war-powers-resolution-senators-congress [hereinafter Walters, War Powers 
Resolution] (reporting on discontent regarding the War Powers Resolution and the failure of 
a lawsuit against President Reagan to enforce the resolution); Tim Ahern, Reagan’s Persian 
Gulf Policy: A Tragedy Waiting to Happen, EVENING NEWS (June 8, 1988), 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1982&dat=19880608&id=MzpRAAAAIBAJ&sj
id=lzMNAAAAIBAJ&pg=1071,686989&hl=en [https://perma.cc/H5FN-9UEH] 
[hereinafter Ahern, Reagan’s Persian Gulf Policy] (recounting Reagan’s policy of putting 
American naval forces in the Persian Gulf to deter Iran without seeking Congressional 
consent). 
46 See Pete Kasperowicz, GOP Bill Would Kill War Powers Measure, HILL (Sept. 10, 2013, at 
01:16 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/321261-gop-bill-would-
terminate-the-war-powers-resolution [https://perma.cc/NV9W-TE8W] [hereinafter 
Kasperowicz, GOP Bill] (recounting attempts of Congressional Republicans to repeal the War 
Powers Resolution); Brigid Schulte, House Rejects GOP Effort to Repeal War Powers Law Forty-
Four Republicans Joined Democrats to Defeat the Repeal. Gingrich Said Bosnia Loomed Large, 
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modification, requiring the President return to a more consultative 
system.47  To date, Congress has not made any modifications.48  Instead, 
the legacy of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is the War Powers Resolution, 
providing the legal cornerstone for current uses of military force including 
the AUMF.49 
3.  9/11 and the AUMFs 
Since the War Powers Resolution, the United States has used military 
force during the first Iraq War and in Somalia.50  The newest changes in 
using military force are the AUMF, which President George W. Bush 
                                                
INQUIRER (June 8, 1995), http://articles.philly.com/1995-06-08/news/25690131_1_repeal-
war-powers-resolution-bosnia-crisis [hereinafter Schulte, Defeat the Repeal] (recounting a 
prior attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution). 
47 See Walters, War Powers Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on Congressional 
misgivings regarding the War Powers Resolution); Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, YOUTUBE (May 14, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iFx98M6PI24 [https://perma.cc/ZL5X-3F36] 
[hereinafter Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution] (presenting Senator Kaine’s 
experiences working in Congress to amend the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG 
WARS, supra note 18, at 273 (noting, among other things, that the lack of cooperation between 
Congress and the Presidency is and should be a key part of the decision to use military force).  
See generally Andre Miksha, Note, Declaring War on the War Powers Resolution, 37 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 651 (2002) [hereinafter Miksha, War Powers Resolution] (arguing to repeal the War 
Powers Resolution and proposing a constitutional amendment making a war council while 
not providing for any cause of action to enforce such an amendment). 
48 See Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (offering Senator Kaine’s 
proposed amendments the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 
273 (observing that Congress and the President need not cooperate which is a key part of the 
deliberations for using military force).  See also generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. 
ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:  HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, 
WORSE THAN IT LOOKS] (arguing that the current political system and Congress does not 
work, resulting in a paralyzed form of governance which other commentators label a 
dysfunctional Congress). 
49 See supra Part II.A.2 (presenting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the resulting War 
Powers Resolution which stem from the fallout of the Vietnam War and is the current basis 
of the legal status for the use of military force). 
50 See, e.g., Auth. to Use United States Mil. Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6 (1992), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1992/12/31/op-olc-v016-p000 
6_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3QN-CGNW] [hereinafter O.L.C., Somalia] (opining to 
President Bill Clinton about presidential discretion to use the military in Somalia).  See also 
MICHAEL R. GORDON & BERNARD E. TRAINOR, THE GENERALS’ WAR:  THE INSIDE STORY OF 
THE CONFLICT IN THE GULF 205 (1995) (describing Congress’s authorization of military force 
against Saddam Hussein with a joint resolution passing by a comfortable margin in the 
House and a more narrow margin in the Senate). 
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sought in the wake of 9/11.51  Whereas the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was 
not understood as a blank check for the Executive Branch, Presidents have 
used the AUMFs—in particular, the first one—to justify military force at 
their discretion.52  Presidents now seek AUMFs as a Congressional 
blessing for military force; for instance, former President Obama 
contemplated a new AUMF against ISIL.53  Yet, the first AUMF remains 
the mainstay for the justification of the use of military force.54  Thus, the 
AUMFs are the new progeny of the War Powers Resolution.55 
B. Problems of Government and Governance 
The War Powers and the War Powers Resolution touches all three 
branches of government.56  Part II.B.1 explains the litigation associated 
                                                
51 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 216–22 (noting the problems with the AUMF 
and claims by President George W. Bush to wage war based on his Article II powers and not 
needing the limits or approval of Congress). 
52 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 126–27 (noting that Senate did not intend the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a blank check to President Johnson).  See also Jack Goldsmith, 
Quick Reactions to Extraordinary Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on the AUMF, 
LAWFARE (May 16, 2013, at 1:53 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/quick-reactions-
extraordinary-senate-armed-services-committee-hearing-aumf?utm_source=twitterfeed& 
utm_medium=twitter [https://perma.cc/L92Z-JH26] [hereinafter Goldsmith, Quick 
Reactions on Hearing on AUMF] (reporting on a Senate committee hearing and showing that 
the military continued to interpret the AUMF as wide-ranging); Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra 
note 9 (declaring the two previous AUMFs provided President Obama sufficient legal 
authority for military operations against ISIL). 
53 See Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMERICAN U., supra note 9 (discussing a draft AUMF for 
force against ISIL which Congress has not passed); Jennifer Daskal, & Stephen I. Vladeck, 
After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 115, 125 (2014) [hereinafter Daskal & Vladeck, After the 
AUMF] (speculating that the Executive Branch would interpret the first AUMF increasingly 
wider regarding which groups fall under the first AUMF). 
54 See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (reporting his 
reaction to an open-ended meaning to the AUMF covering future foes not contemporary of 
the first AUMF); Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra note 9 (declaring the President’s legal position 
that the two previous AUMFs legally justified military operations against ISIL); Daskal & 
Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note 53, at 125 (arguing that the Executive Branch would 
more widely interpret which groups are covered by the first AUMF meaning the first AUMF 
has an almost unlimited shelf life). 
55  See supra Part II.A (showing the history from the founding to the present era for using 
military force). 
56  See infra Part II.B.1 (presenting the courts and failures to litigate the War Powers 
Resolution); infra Part II.B.2 (showing the Legislative Branch and Executive Branch and the 
War Powers Resolution and general War Powers). 
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with the War Powers Resolution and the Judicial Branch. 57  Part II.B.2 
surveys the other two Branches.58 
1. Going to Court on the War Powers Resolution 
Multiple parties have sought to litigate the War Powers Resolution.59  
The War Powers Resolution has proven resistant to litigation.60  The first 
problem is standing discussed in Part II.B.1.a.61  Beyond standing are other 
judicial doctrines barring litigation in Part II.B.1.b.62 
a. Standing for Plaintiff to a Lawsuit, whether member of Congress or not 
Standing is a fundamental constitutional concept. 63  If plaintiffs lack 
standing, courts dismiss the lawsuit.64  Standing means that plaintiffs can 
show particularized injury in their complaint, and does not include 
taxpayers.65  Two types of plaintiffs have brought lawsuits over the War 
                                                
57  See supra Part II.B.1 (presenting the judicial doctrines barring litigation of the War 
Powers Resolution). 
58  See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the Legislative Branch and its role in the War Powers 
Resolution and general War Powers and detailing the Executive Branch and its 
encroachment on the War Powers). 
59 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–28 (1974) 
(granting judgment to defendants because of lack of standing and inability to show actual 
injury); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the 2003 
invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item, even when the plaintiffs included parents of 
soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 
F. Supp. 333, 334 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing an action by Congress members seeking 
President Reagan’s report per the War Powers Resolution). 
60 See Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) 
(dismissing Captain Smith’s lawsuit).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 271 
(noting that significant commenters such as Posner the Younger declare the War Powers 
Resolution to be “dead letter law”); infra Part II.B.1.0 (describing the standing doctrine and 
lack thereof dismisses further suits); infra Part II.B.1.0 (describing doctrines including 
political question doctrine, military deference, and other doctrines inter alia leading the 
courts to dismiss suits involving the War Powers Resolution). 
61 See infra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the doctrine of standing in the context of the War Powers 
Resolution and differences in the standing analysis whether the plaintiff is or is not a member 
of Congress). 
62 See infra Part II.B.1.b (noting other judicial doctrines dismissing litigation involving the 
War Powers Resolution). 
63 See Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a plaintiff must have standing, and standing must be established by showing 
actual injury). 
64 See id. (holding that a plaintiff requires standing, and standing means actual legal 
injury).  See also Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 
2016) (holding that Captain Smith’s lawsuit was dismissed based on lack of standing). 
65 See Nat’l Treas. Emps.’ Union, 101 F.3d at 1427–28 (explaining the importance of standing 
which is determined by actual legal injury to plaintiff).  See also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (holding that an injury must be particular to the plaintiff for there to 
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Powers Resolution and military force:  (1) members of Congress and (2) 
everyone else.66   
Members of the military, part of the everyone-elses, can also bring suit 
like Captain Smith, whose complaint recited his injuries to show 
standing.67  His presumed legal injuries, however, did not grant standing, 
and the courts have found other reasons to dismiss on standing for 
military members.68  Therefore, standing is the initial constitutional hurdle 
that plaintiffs must overcome.69 
                                                
be standing); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–21 (1974) 
(holding that a case litigating the War Powers is dismissed due to standing which must show 
actual injury which plaintiffs could not show); Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D.D.C. 
1998) (outlining the requirements for standing for a lawsuit in which a citizen sued the U.S. 
Senate to change its rules); Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 935 F.2d 
1278 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that merely being a taxpayer could not provide the requisite 
legal injury to grant standing to plaintiff in his suit).  Peitsch also denotes that standing 
challenges government action, and “[p]romotes separation of powers . . . preventing 
lawsuits [who have] only an academic interest in the outcome of the case [while] ensuring 
that a specific controversy is [brought] before the court and that interested advocates litigate 
the controversy.”  Id. 
66 See, e.g., Pietsch, 755 F. Supp. at 66 (finding that the plaintiff could not claim standing 
merely by being a taxpayer); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding 
the court would dismiss an action brought by Congress members to force President Reagan 
to report, per the War Powers resolution, on his military actions in the Persian Gulf in 
combating Iran and Iranian forces).  The distinction between members of Congress and non-
members is a clear divide for all the case law regarding standing.  
67 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843 (D.D.C. 2016), 2016 WL 2347065, at *2–
*3 (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a legal 
injury to Captain Smith because President Obama’s orders violate a soldier’s oath). 
68 See id. (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a 
legal injury to Captain Smith given that the effects of President Obama’s military orders 
violate a soldier’s oath to Constitution and country); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 
WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (“[b]ecause the specific legal injury about which he 
complains is not sufficiently concrete or particularized,” i.e. Captain Smith lacked standing).  
See also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying the Ash test from Cort v. 
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which provides for the private cause of action within a statute, and 
the court ruling that Ange did have standing even as the court dismissed the lawsuit on other 
grounds).  But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 216–21 (holding that a case is 
dismissed due to standing which must show actual injury despite the plaintiffs being 
reservist and active-duty soldiers). 
69 See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 215–221 (holding that a case is dismissed 
due to standing which must show actual injury even when the plaintiffs are soldiers); Doe v. 
Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq 
under President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when parents of soldiers, 
active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members are the plaintiffs); Pietsch, 755 F. 
Supp. at 66 (holding that plaintiff’s claims of being a taxpayer did not grant standing); Ange, 
752 F. Supp. at 511 (applying the Ash test from Cort v. Ash to interpret a private cause of 
action within a statute, and the court ruling that Ange did have standing to challenge the 
first Gulf War even as the court dismissed the lawsuit on political question); Lederman, 
Captain Smith’s Suit, supra note 11 (describing how Captain Smith’s suit will fail based on 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss3/2
2018] Perpetual Warfare 469 
Member of Congress have also tried to litigate the War Powers 
Resolution.70  Similarly, members of Congress must also have standing.71  
Likewise, the courts have dismissed Congressional members’ suits for 
lacking standing, even claims of standing based on stewardship of 
taxpayer dollars.72  Although often lacking standing and thereby access to 
the courts, members of Congress also have access to Congressional fora to 
disagree with military action which they should utilize rather than the 
courts.73  Moreover, the courts will typically find that Congress cannot 
litigate the War Powers Resolution.74  
b. Dismissal Unattached to Standing 
Beyond standing, courts have other doctrinal reasons to dismiss any 
litigation involving the War Powers Resolution beyond simply standing.75  
One doctrine is mootness, and another is political question.76  The courts 
                                                
standing); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit, supra note 11 (predicting that Captain Smith’s 
lawsuit will fail due to the political question doctrine and standing problem). 
70 See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under 
President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when plaintiffs included 
congressional members); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that President Reagan’s actions 
in the Persian Gulf were non-justiciable and that Congress members lacked standing). 
71  See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that a lawsuit including members of Congress to 
prevent the invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item); 
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge 
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf). 
72 See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress 
cannot use the courts under the War Powers Resolution to review Executive actions).  See 
also Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (dismissing a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under President 
George W. Bush was a non-justiciable item, even when including plaintiffs included 
congressional members); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that a lawsuit by members of 
Congress seeking a report per the War Powers Resolution on President Reagan’s actions in 
the Persian Gulf was non-justiciable because Congress members lacked standing). 
73 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the 
congressional forum to express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by 
standing and political question doctrines); Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (dismissing as a non-
justiciable item a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq under President George W. Bush despite 
parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and congressional members being the 
plaintiffs); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that judicial review of President Reagan’s 
actions in the Persian Gulf based on a lawsuit by Congress members was non-justiciable).  
See generally Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a 
Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy because the 
Congressman had a congressional forum to challenge presidential power).  
74 See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (dismissing a suit by Congress to review Executive 
actions under the War Powers Resolution).  
75 See supra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the contours for standing problems leading to dismissal 
of lawsuits); infra Part II.B.1.b (presenting other doctrines leading to dismissal of lawsuits 
litigating the War Powers Resolution). 
76 See, e.g., Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that the 
invasion of Grenada had already occurred, making the issue moot and thereby non-
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also have a favored disposition toward the military and national 
security.77  Finally, the Feres Doctrine bars civil suits against the military.78  
All of these doctrines lead to dismissal.79 
Mootness means that a controversy is no longer ripe, and a recurring 
injury does not counter mootness.80  Even if plaintiffs had standing to 
bring a case, military action may move too swiftly for the courts to react.81  
In short, sometimes the military action has already achieved its purpose, 
removing the impetus for the lawsuit, hence the problem of mootness.82 
Certain controversies are, by their nature, outside of what the courts 
will entertain; as Justice Douglass noted “[u]sed to bar from the courts 
questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate 
Branches to resolve, viz., the so-called political question.”83  The political 
question doctrine is a narrow doctrine and relates to the enumerated 
powers of the various branches.84  The War Powers are enumerated 
                                                
justiciable); infra Part II.B.1.b (describing, inter alia the political question doctrine meaning 
that certain controversies are issues solved by the political branches, i.e., Legislative and 
Executive branches, and are therefore non-justiciable controversies which are beyond court 
rulings).  
77 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (discussing 
the doctrines of state secrets and general deference to the military and military acts).  See also 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1953) (presenting the state secrets privilege). 
78 See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine 
and its bar to civil suits). 
79 See supra Part II.B.1.a (outlining the standing doctrine and problems associated 
therewith, leading to dismissal of lawsuits).  See also infra Part II.B.1.b (outlining other 
doctrines which bar lawsuits tied to the War Powers and War Powers Resolution). 
80 See generally Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Congressmen lacked standing in a suit by Congressmen suing President Clinton over the use 
of military force in Yugoslavia, but also noting in dicta and concurrence that mootness was 
an alternative doctrine which would have dismissed the case); Whitney v. Obama, 845 
F.Supp.2d 136 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that the controversy was moot even if there was an 
alleged recurring violation and that mootness of the suit did assume that the plaintiff had 
standing).  See also Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (holding that mootness made the lawsuit to 
prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already occurred and 
continued occupation did not offend the War Powers Resolution). 
81 See Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (holding that mootness rendered the lawsuit to prevent the 
invasion of Grenada non-justiciable and thus dismissed the case because the invasion had 
already occurred and continued occupation did not offend the War Powers Resolution).  See 
also Whitney, 845 F.Supp.2d at 137–40 (holding that the controversy was moot despite an 
alleged recurring violation and whilst mootness of the suit did assume that the plaintiff had 
standing). 
82 See Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1125 (dismissing the lawsuit on grounds of mootness because 
the invasion of Grenada had already occurred). 
83 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974). 
84 See generally § 3534.1 Political Questions—Political Issues and Separation of Powers, 
13C FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. § 3534.1 (3d ed.) (outlining the contours and limits of the 
political question doctrine).  But see generally Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? 
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powers, and the courts have dismissed various lawsuits based on the 
political question doctrine.85  For instance, the court noted the political 
question doctrine was an alternative reason to dismiss Captain Smith’s 
suit.86  Thus, the political question doctrine is also a bar to litigating the 
War Powers and War Powers Resolution.87 
One other ground for dismissal is general deference to the military 
and national security.88  The state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary 
privilege which keeps information related to state secrets or national 
security out of the courts for fear of disclosure.89  The states secrets 
doctrine also has an example of false invocation, such as United States v. 
Reynolds.90  Moreover, in recent years the state’s secrets doctrine has 
                                                
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
237 (2002) (questioning the political question doctrine). 
85 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962) (dismissing a challenge via litigation, 
asserting the requirements of standing and doctrine of political question).  See also Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the congressional forum to 
express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by standing and political 
question doctrines when seeking to assert standing as a legislature for challenging 
presidential action); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to 
prevent George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item, even when plaintiffs 
ranged from parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and to congressional 
members); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing a challenge to the 
President’s Vietnam War policy). 
86  See Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) 
(“the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims raise non-justiciable political questions”). 
87 See supra Part II.B.1.b (explaining the political question doctrine and its problems for 
litigation of the War Powers Resolution). 
88 See infra Part II.B.1.b (outlining, inter alia, the state secrets doctrine and its various 
flavors as well as the general deference to the military, both of which are doctrinal hurdles 
for using the courts to pursue legal action based on the War Powers Resolution). 
89 Compare Robert E. Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets:  A Response to Professor 
Telman, 63 ALA. L. REV. 667, 668–70 (2011) (replying to an article stating that the states secrets 
doctrine, which forbids lawsuits based on secrecy includes the Totten doctrine, which 
Professor Telman maintains (and teaches) is a purely contract doctrine dealing with the non-
justiciability of a secret agreement to spy between President Lincoln and his agent with 
secrecy as an inferred term), with D.A. Jeremy Telman, On the Conflation of the State Secrets 
Privilege and the Totten Doctrine, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2191656 [https://perma.cc/PNH5-D42N] (explaining that the state secrets privilege cannot 
be conflated with the Totten Doctrine of contracts which deals solely with inferred terms of 
secrecy, forbidding justiciability of the contract apart from any state secrets), and D. A. 
Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses:  Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. 
L. REV. 429 (2011) (explaining problems with the expanded state secrets doctrine and its 
morphing from a doctrine centered around evidentiary to a doctrine of dismissal as well as 
analyzing the misuse of the Totten Doctrine). 
90 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1953) (holding, in a wrongful death 
case of an Air Force accident resulting in death of a crewman, that it was reasonably possible 
that military secrets were involved and that there existed sufficient showing of privilege to 
cut off further demand for production making state secrets an evidentiary privilege).  But see 
ANDREW BACEVICH, THE LIMITS OF POWER: THE END OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, 86 (2008) 
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transformed from an evidentiary privilege to a dispositive privilege to 
dismiss suits.91  Additionally, the courts have shown a degree of deference 
toward the military and military policy underscoring the President’s 
authority as Commander-in-Chief.92  One example is the Koramatsu 
decision, where the Court found that military necessity was an adequate 
reason for the internment of Japanese-Americans.93  Taken together, state 
secrets and deference to the military are additional bars to litigation.94 
Finally, specific to military members, is the Feres Doctrine, which 
grants civil suit immunity to the military in a wide variety of causes of 
action.95  The end result is that the courts dismiss these suits under the 
                                                
[hereinafter BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER] (recounting, from another source, the subsequent 
history of Reynolds, where later declassified documents showed that the claim of disclosure 
of national secrets and threat to national security proved to be an outright lie to hide 
embarrassment rather than the possibility of secrets being disclosed, in turn showing how 
the national security excuse can be used to hide questionable conduct). 
91 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–12 (holding that it was reasonably possible that military 
secrets were involved in an Air Force accident which sufficed to cut off further demand for 
production in discovery).  But see BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 86–87 
(recapitulating the subsequent declassified history of United States v. Reynolds and showing 
that the claim of disclosure of national secrets and threat to national security proved to hide 
embarrassment rather than disclosure of secrets); Glenn Greenwald, Court Accepts DOJ’s 
‘State Secrets’ Claim to Protect Shadowy Neocons: a New Low, INTERCEPT (Mar. 26, 2015, 9:34 
AM) https://theintercept.com/2015/03/26/new-low-obama-doj-federal-courts-abusing-
state-secrets-privilege/ [https://perma.cc/62PS-ZF6X] [hereinafter Greenwald, Court 
Accepts DOJ’s ‘State Secrets’ Claim] (commenting on the dismissal of Restis v. Am. Coalition 
Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., 13 CIV. 5032 ER, 2015 WL 1344479 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) and 
questioning why, in a private civil litigation tort suit between someone claiming defamation 
and a lobbyist group, did the DOJ intervened and had the suit dismissed based on the states 
secret doctrine and commenting on the state secrets doctrine’s transformation under the 
George W. Bush and Obama Presidencies to a dispositive doctrine). 
92 See generally Winter v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (holding the 
U.S. Navy, in order to train, could conduct sonar training per an exception granted by the 
President); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (remarking on the deference to 
government agencies against injunctive relief such as the CIA); Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that deference to national security and military met the standard 
of strict scrutiny necessitated by a racial classification); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 
(1897) (holding that the President as executive controls the military while Congress controls 
military regulations). 
93 See 323 U.S. at 215–24 (holding that national security and military necessity met 
constitutional strict scrutiny of a racial classification underpinning internment of Japanese-
Americans during WWII). 
94 See supra Part II.B.1.b (outlining the complementary doctrines of state secrets and 
general deference to the military functioning as bars to litigation of the War Powers or War 
Powers Resolution). 
95 See generally Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine, 
which holds that the military has civil suit immunity from members of the military or their 
widows when the injury arises from conditions endemic to military service).  See also Smith 
v. United States, 196 F.3d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the Feres Doctrine and barring a 
civil suit for sexual assault); The Feres Doctrine and Sexual Assault, 50 TR. 54, 54 (March 2014) 
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Feres Doctrine.96  Because Captain Smith’s suit is against the Commander-
in-Chief, such a suit could also be barred under the Feres Doctrine, 
although the Feres Doctrine has primarily been a torts doctrine.97  Thus, 
the Feres Doctrine could act as a bar to litigants.98  In short, multiple 
judicial doctrines exist, such as standing, or mootness, or political 
questions, which bar litigation of the War Powers doctrine.99 
2. Congress and Legislative Turmoil and the Executive Branch and its 
Prerogatives 
If the War Powers are truly a political question, then part of the blame 
is with Congress.100  Congress, as a legislature, is a barometer of the 
public’s concern and mores.101  Congress has the power to declare war and 
also to amend the War Powers Resolution.102  Congress also has the power 
                                                
(detailing the Feres Doctrine and its bar to civil suits, especially in the context of sexual 
assault). 
96 See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57–59 (1985) (holding that the Feres Doctrine 
bars a civil suit of wrongful death when one soldier kills another soldier who is off-duty); 
Smith, 196 F.3d at 775 (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars civil suits in the context of one 
member of the military suing another for sexual assault tort damages); The Feres Doctrine and 
Sexual Assault, 50 TR. 54, 54 (March 2014) (detailing the Feres Doctrine as a bar to civil suits 
involving tort damages for sexual assault). 
97 See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 556-57 (1897) (holding that the President 
as executive controls the military as Commander-in-Chief while Congress controls military 
regulations via legislation); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) 
(holding that the Commander-in-Chief is a part of the chain-of-command).  See also Feres, 340 
U.S. at 146 (introducing the Feres Doctrine and U.S. government and military civil suit 
immunity). 
98 See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (holding that the government has civil suit immunity from 
members of the military or their widows when the injury arises from conditions endemic to 
military service extending to the military branches). 
99 See supra Part II.B.1 (outlining doctrinal bars to litigation of the War Powers Resolution 
which can lead to dismissal of the lawsuit). 
100 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas 
J., dissenting) (speaking on the political question doctrine, which is “[a]lso used to bar from 
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches 
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question”).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, 
at 273 (viewing as key that the lack of cooperation between Congress and the Presidency in 
the decision to use military force). 
101 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 330–31 (1989) in holding that acts of the [legislatures] serve as objective evidence for the 
attitudes of society).  But see generally MIKE LOFGREN, THE PARTY IS OVER: HOW REPUBLICANS 
WENT CRAZY, DEMOCRATS BECAME USELESS, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS GOT SHAFTED (2012) 
(arguing that the Republican Party has transitioned into a parliamentary party within the 
U.S. system which is a reason for the paralysis of government based on partisan politics). 
102 See Kasperowicz, GOP Bill, supra note 46 (reporting on attempts of Congressional 
Republicans to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Schulte, Defeat the Repeal, supra note 46 
(recounting an attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Walters, War Powers Resolution, 
supra note 45 (presenting a report of Congressional misgivings in the War Powers 
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of the purse, meaning that they could cease funding the military despite 
the bitter pill politically.103  Congress has also not repealed either of the 
AUMFs, and Congress’ continued funding for the military is tacit 
agreement on the use of military force amidst Congress’ calls for a new 
AUMF.104  One possible solution proposed is for Congress to have an 
office for litigation, using the courts alongside legislative fora.105  Congress 
also suffers from problems of partisanship, which aids Executive Branch 
encroachment.106  Moreover, multiple lawsuits have had their impetus 
with partisan sentiments.107 
                                                
Resolution); Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (presenting Senator 
Kaine’s failure to amend the War Powers Resolution); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 
273 (mentioning that the lack of cooperation between Congress and the Presidency is a key 
component of the decision to use military force).  See also Miksha, War Powers Resolution, 
supra note 47, at 690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment while repealing the War 
Powers Resolution and making a war council while lacking express enforcement). 
103 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e. that 
Congress votes for funding military operations).  Compare YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra 
note 27, at 352–53 (arguing that Congress retains the power of the purse, and can fund or not 
fund military power, regardless of political cost), with GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 
203–04 (noting Yoo’s argument that the War Powers is not a restraint on the presidency, and 
this argument ignores the complex history surrounding the War Powers Resolution); and 
KENNETH SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics and International Relations 489–90, in HANDBOOK OF INT’L 
REL. (Walter Carlsnaes et al eds., 2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics] (citing 
Mueller as an example to describe the “rally around the flag effect” in which a country’s 
leader, e.g., the President, receives increased political support when the country becomes 
involved in military conflict). 
104 See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 231 (remarking that continued 
Congressional funding legitimized prosecution of the Vietnam War); Cody Poplin, 35 
Lawmakers Pen Bipartisan Letter Calling for ISIS AUMF, LAWFARE (Nov. 9, 2015, 5:08 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/35-lawmakers-pen-bipartisan-letter-calling-isis-aumf 
[https://perma.cc/C7PB-7PTW] [hereinafter Poplin, 35 Lawmakers Pen Bipartisan AUMF] 
(noting that lawmakers requested a new AUMF for ISIL); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit, 
supra note 11 (remarking that Congress’ continued funding of military operations is a tacit 
acknowledgement of Presidential-led military action). 
105 See generally Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 968 (2012) 
[hereinafter Frost, Congress in Court] (arguing that Congress should more vigorously 
challenge, via lawsuit, Executive encroachment). 
106 See generally Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress 
should more vigorously challenge Executive encroachment by using the courts); MANN & 
ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 48 (maintaining that the current constitutional 
political system and Congress are paralyzed due to a hyper partisan Republican party). 
107 See Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that mootness 
dismissed the lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 
333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that members of Congress could not judicially contest 
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf).  See generally Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 
1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the courts are barred for Congress to review 
Executive actions under the War Powers Resolution); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 
(D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that Congress lacked standing and was also barred by the political 
question doctrine of challenging a President’s foreign policy decisions because the President 
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On the other hand, if the War Powers are truly a political question, 
then the other part of the blame lies with the Executive Branch.108  Post-
WWII, the Executive Branch monopolized deciding to use military force, 
moving from an interbranch decision to an interagency decision within 
the Executive Branch.109  From this confluence comes the argument that 
Congress does not declare war, but rather that the Executive Branch does 
so while Congress supports it and pays for it.110  Regardless of political 
party, the DOJ’s OLC has authored multiple opinions arguing that the 
President can use military force absent Congress’ approval, even when the 
situation looks analogous to war.111  This opinion remains bipartisan 
                                                
determines the national interest); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy because 
the Congressman should have challenged presidential power in Congress). 
108 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas 
J., dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from 
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches 
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question” meaning that the lawsuit would also have 
failed based on the political question doctrine).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, 
at 273 (noting that a key part of the decision to use military force rests on the lack of 
cooperation between Congress and the Presidency). 
109 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) (holding 
that the President is the constitutional representative of the United States for foreign affairs, 
and that his decisions, pursuant to legislative directive are at their highest to withstand 
judicial scrutiny); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 53 (noting the change from 
interbranch decision-making on the use of military force between Congress and the President 
to an interagency decision after 1945).  See also id. at 63–64 (describing the interagency 
approach after the decision of Curtiss-Wright set a legal mainstay of subsuming the war 
powers within the Executive’s powers of foreign policy). 
110 See YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 144–52 (arguing that the original textual 
meaning of “declare” which allows Congress to declare war should not be taken to mean 
that Congress initiates war). 
111 See generally Authority to use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (2011), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-
military-use-in-libya_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/43EA-8NVL] [hereinafter O.L.C., Libya] 
(opining to President Barack Obama that using military force in Libya was within the 
President’s constitutional authority minus a declaration of war or prior approval from 
Congress because of the low scale of the use of military power and the prior uses of military 
force for limited objectives such as Bosnia or Kosovo); Effect of a Recent U.N.S.C. Res. on the 
Auth. of the President Under Int’l L. To Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 Op. O.L.C. 199 (2002), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2002/11/31/op-olc-v026-
p0199_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ94-PWKA] [hereinafter O.L.C., Iraq II] (opining to 
President George W. Bush about the second AUMF and the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions); Auth. of the President Under Dom. & Int’l. L. to Use Mil. Force Against Iraq, 26 Op. 
O.L.C. 143 (2002), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2002/10/ 
31/op-olc-v026-p0143_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6WM-HR85] [hereinafter O.L.C., Iraq I] 
(opining to President George W. Bush about presidential discretion and use of military force 
against Iraq); The President’s Con. Auth. to Conduct Mil. Operations Against Terrorists and 
Nations Supporting Them, 25 Op. O.L.C. 188 (2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/olc/opinions/2001/09/31/op-olc-v025-p0188_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S85-
Dechert: Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
476 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
policy for multiple Presidencies.112  Presidents have treated Congressional 
resolutions as an acknowledgement of Presidential decisions rather than 
the greenlight for military action.113  But this legal status has not been 
viewed as aberrant.114  Moreover, the President, guarding the national 
interest, remains the paramount office involved in foreign policy, 
upholding the President’s oath, including defense of the country.115  Such 
actions have also not led to impeachment of the President.116  Moreover, 
the Presidency remains the major office with the greatest degree of power 
                                                
B6H5] [hereinafter O.L.C., Terrorists] (opining to President George W. Bush about his 
presidential discretion and powers to conduct operations against terrorism); O.L.C., Somalia, 
supra note 50 (opining about the presidential discretion to use the military in Somalia in 
1992). 
112 See also generally Chris Edelson, Breaking the Cycle of Unrestrained Presidential National 
Security Power, 32–33, (Aug. 2, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2817544 [https://perma.cc/285Y-VR9Q] [hereinafter Edelson, Breaking the Cycle] (arguing 
that there is more that the courts and Congress can do within the framework of the War 
Powers Resolution to improve the decision-making process for employing military force).  
See generally O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining about the second AUMF and Presidential 
Authority); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining about George W. Bush’s presidential 
discretion and use of military force against Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining 
about George W. Bush’s presidential discretion and powers to conduct operations against 
terrorism per the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50 (opining on the use of military 
force as within President Bill Clinton’s discretion); Glenn Greenwald, Key Democrats, Led by 
Hillary Clinton, Leave No doubt that Endless War is Official U.S. Doctrine, INTERCEPT (Oct. 7, 
2014, at 7:56 AM), https://theintercept.com/2014/10/07/key-democrats-led-hillary-
clinton-leave-doubt-endless-war-u-s-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/8C5K-UWRQ] 
[hereinafter Greenwald, Key Democrats] (arguing that a change in presidents will not change 
the U.S. policy of perpetual war). 
113 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated 
authorizations from Congress as sufficient blessings rather than necessary grants of 
permission). 
114 See generally Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 112 (arguing that Congress and the 
courts can do more within the framework of the War Powers Resolution by applying 
tangential case law limiting Executive power). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) 
(articulating the primacy of the President in the realm of foreign policy and defining the 
national interest).  See also Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684 
F.3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers to the President 
and their use for detention); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 8 (noting the President’s oath to 
preserve, protect, and defend); The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 659–66 (1862) (holding that 
Congress’ declaration of war does not preclude the President’s military orders during an 
existing state of belligerency); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use 
of Military Force, WASHINGTON Q., Spring 2003, at 89, 90–91 (explaining the Caroline Doctrine 
and its limited parameters allowing for preemptive self-defense as long as:  (1) the threat is 
imminent; (2) all alternatives to use of force are exhausted; and (3) the response is 
proportional); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, the American National Interest and a 
Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2004) (arguing that the President’s oath endows 
the President with certain national security powers to uphold that oath).  
116 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240 (decrying the possibility of impeachment 
as a remedy for consequences of the President’ use of military force). 
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regarding the use of military force.117  In short, the Executive Branch has 
nearly monopolized the decision to use the military.118 
C. Policy Implications and Constitutional Amendments  
Perpetual war has had multiple effects on American foreign and 
domestic policy.119  Part II.C.1 presents the policy implications of 
perpetual war.120  Part II.C.2 presents the ways of amending the U.S. 
Constitution.121 
                                                
117  See Alex Emmons, Major New Court Ruling Says “Even The President” Can’t Declare 
Torture Lawful, INTERCEPT (Oct. 21, 2016, at 1:45 AM), https://theintercept.com/ 
2016/10/21/major-new-court-ruling-says-even-the-president-cant-declare-torture-lawful/ 
[https://perma.cc/MW8R-UUPJ] (reporting a court ruling that the President cannot 
intervene to protect a company accused of complicity in torture based solely on the 
President’s authority); Glenn Greenwald, Democrats, Trump, and the Ongoing, Dangerous 
Refusal to Learn the Lesson of Brexit, INTERCEPT (Nov. 9, 2016, at 9:43 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/11/09/democrats-trump-and-the-ongoing-dangerous-
refusal-to-learn-the-lesson-of-brexit/ [https://perma.cc/TJ9W-66QD] [hereinafter 
Greenwald, Brexit] (detailing the war powers of the President which President Trump will 
take upon his ascension to the Presidency, including the high concentration of powers under 
the Executive Branch); Alex Emmons, Commander-In-Chief Donald Trump Will Have Terrifying 
Powers. Thanks, Obama., INTERCEPT (Nov. 11, 2016, at 2:39 PM), https://theintercept.com/ 
2016/11/11/commander-in-chief-donald-trump-will-have-terrifying-powers-thanks-
obama/ [https://perma.cc/HRQ7-DLX5] [hereinafter Emmons, Thanks Obama] (detailing 
the War Powers of President Trump including the drone program and other military powers 
which are currently within the expanded powers of the Executive Branch).  See also generally 
Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (holding that the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, is the apex of the military chain-of-command). 
118 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated 
authorizations not as grants of permission but as blessing to a pre-determined course of 
action).  See generally O.L.C., Libya, supra note 111 (opining that the use of military force in 
Libya was within the President’s constitutional authority without a declaration of war or 
prior approval from Congress because the low scale of the use of military power was not 
“war”);  O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining to President George W. Bush about the second 
AUMF and Presidential Authority, the national interest, and presidential discretion); O.L.C., 
Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining on presidential discretion and use of military force against 
Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining about George W. Bush’s war powers to 
conduct operations against terrorism under the first AUMF);  O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50 
(opining about Bill Clinton’s presidential discretion to use military force);  Frost, Congress in 
Court, supra note 105, at 949, 968 (arguing that Congress should more vigorously challenge 
encroachment by the Executive Branch via the judiciary). 
119 See infra Part II.C.1 (noting the domestic and foreign policy implications of perpetual 
war). 
120  See infra Part II.C.1 (describing the domestic and foreign policy implications of 
perpetual war such as economic pressures upon the political system as well as a more 
militarized foreign policy). 
121  See infra Part II.C.2 (outlining the ways and pitfalls of amending the U.S. Constitution). 
Dechert: Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
478 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
1. Policy Implications of Perpetual War 
Profound policy implications and results of the current legal status for 
the use of military force exist, which some have described as enabling 
perpetual war.122  Perpetual war has multiple effects, which warp the 
policies of the United States.123  One warping effect is the extreme amounts 
of money spent on national security, which can exacerbate political 
incentives, further incentivizing Presidential use of military force and 
Congressional abdication.124  This national security spending is also 
deficit-driven, meaning further expenditures actually reduce security.125  
Another warping effect suggested is the overly heavy reliance on military 
force as a tool of foreign policy.126   
One further point is that the perpetual war policy tempts further 
interventionist military adventurism, a popular policy with foreign policy 
elites.127  This policy, which often backfires, perpetuates various 
                                                
122 See Emmons, Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in 
the Middle East appears the cornerstone of American foreign policy). 
123 See Glenn Greenwald, The Decade’s Biggest Scam, SALON (Aug. 29, 2011, at 09:30 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/08/29/terrorism_39/ [https://perma.cc/W2GW-SN6Q] 
[hereinafter Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam] (critiquing the large amount of money spent 
on security resulting from the “War on Terror”); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 
(arguing persuasively that a change in holder of the Presidency will not overturn the U.S. 
policy of perpetual war). 
124 See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (critiquing the amount of spending 
based on the “War on Terror” in vain pursuit of security).  See generally THORPE, AMERICAN 
WARFARE STATE, supra note 37 (arguing that the explosion of military funding has 
disproportionately increased pro-war pressures upon congressional districts and states with 
less-diversified economies, leading to support and congressional abdication).  
125 See BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 10–11 (pointing out the deficit 
spending funding the national security state ends up reducing the capabilities of the United 
States). 
126  See U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategic Conference, supra note 12 (presenting a debate 
between Dr. Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier where both parties agree on the excessive 
militarization of U.S. foreign policy relies heavily on the military to accomplish U.S. foreign 
policy goals).  See also William & Mary U., Stephen Walt William and Mary’s IR Institute, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wu0WxTIc1RA [hereinafter 
William & Mary U., Stephen Walt] (containing a comment by Professor Walt indicating how 
the United States, and the United States alone, has a global military footprint and geographic 
combatant commands covering the entire world and leading to the problem of any crisis 
anywhere in the world impinges U.S. credibility and its military strength per other 
commentators). 
127 See Stephen Walt, Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (April 25, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/why-is-america-so-
bad-at-promoting-democracy-in-other-countries/ [https://perma.cc/LR95-SM9J] (arguing 
that interventionism is a popular policy despite America’s abject failure in pursuit of this 
policy); Stephen Walt, Why Is America’s Foreign Policy Still Punching Above Its Weight?, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 6, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/why-is-americas-
foreign-policy-still-punching-above-its-weight/ [https://perma.cc/B3UA-DQVP] (raising 
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pathologies within the U.S. foreign policy community.128  Such a policy 
remains propped up by threat-mongering, even threat-mongering about 
terrorism.129  Even a prospective change in the Presidency does not auger 
an end of such a policy of perpetual war and its negative effects.130  
Additionally, the policy of interventionism precludes other strategies, 
such as off-shore balancing and removing military forces to maintain a 
                                                
the question of whether the United States’ foreign policy, due to its providential geopolitical 
situation, attempts to do too much with the detriment borne mostly by nations in which the 
United States practices its interventions); Stephen Walt, Don’t Knock Offshore Balancing Until 
You’ve Tried It, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 8, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/08/dont-
knock-offshore-balancing-youve-tried-it-obama-middle-east-realism-liberal-hegemony/ 
[https://perma.cc/PP6H-R6RC] [hereinafter Walt, Offshore Balancing] (arguing that a more 
realist foreign policy means re-examining offshore balancing and its differences from the 
more liberal interventionist or neo-conservative foreign policy which treats a interventionist 
foreign policy as a mark of leadership).   
128 See William & Mary U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen Walt,  
a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position surrounded by weak countries and 
two oceans and America’s great wealth provide enough isolation to insulate America from 
the persistent problems stemming from an often incorrect foreign policy elite which lacks 
accountability for its numerous failures, proving a dictum misattributed to Otto von Bismark 
“there is a special kind of Providence which watches out for fools, drunkards, and the United 
States of America”). 
129 See Stephen Walt, Monsters of Our Own Imaginings, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 24, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/monsters-of-our-own-imaginings-brussels-
bombings-islamic-state/ [https://perma.cc/LBP4-NQAK] (arguing that terrorism is an 
example of threat inflation and does not pose an existential threat); Stephen Walt, Chill Out, 
America, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 29, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/chill-out-
america-fear-terror-threats/ [https://perma.cc/8D2R-L2D7] (noting the problems of threat 
inflation); WILLIAM & MARY U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen 
Walt,  a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position and great wealth provide 
enough isolation to insulate America from the persistent problems stemming from an often 
incorrect foreign policy elite which engages in threat inflation and fear mongering to make 
insignificant threats, such as Iran, into giants which are inflated beyond their actual degree 
of threat); Glenn Greenwald, For Terrorist Fearmongers, It’s Always the Scariest Time Ever, 
INTERCEPT (June 2, 2015, at 1:25 PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/06/02/fear-mongers-
always-scariest-time-ever/ [https://perma.cc/RX9Y-SQX5] (noting the fearmongering 
associated with counterterrorism, with multiple instances of political and counterterrorism 
figures insisting, over the years, that a terrorist attack was nigh, but which failed to 
materialize).  
130 See Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing that a change in who is president 
will not change U.S. policy of perpetual war).  But see Stephen Walt, Why Are We So Sure 
Hillary Will Be a Hawk?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/ 
09/25/why-are-we-so-sure-hillary-will-be-a-hawk-election-trump-syria-iraq-obama/ 
[https://perma.cc/7PMQ-38WU] (expressing doubt that then-presidential-candidate 
Hillary Clinton would be an interventionist President given the major structural problems 
facing the United States which would be exacerbated in the event of an international 
interventionist agenda attributed (with ample historical reason) to Hillary Clinton). 
Dechert: Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
480 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
balance of power.131  In short, the current legal status of perpetual war 
relates to self-augmenting policy and strategic problems.132 
2. Amending the Constitution 
Finally, the Constitution could be amended rather than simply 
amending the War Powers Resolution; an amendment has been proposed 
before, focusing on expanding the people entrusted with the decision to 
use military force into a war council.133  The Constitution has proven, over 
time, to be extremely difficult to amend, requiring super-majorities within 
both houses of Congress and the States.134  Moreover, the various 
amendments to the Constitution have focused primarily on extending 
freedoms rather than representing a tinkering in the original workings of 
the Constitution.135  One commentator has also questioned whether the 
U.S. Constitution and its conceptions of governance actually function well 
in the 21st Century, or whether its conceptions are antiquated notions 
                                                
131  See Walt, Offshore Balancing, supra note 127 (arguing that a more realist foreign policy 
means re-examining the policy of off-shore balancing, which places forces outside of a 
perceived hotspot, and its differences from the more liberal interventionist or neo-
conservative foreign policy which treats an interventionist foreign policy as a mark of 
leadership); JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 140–43 (2001) 
(arguing, as a realist, the United States is a regional hegemon and as a realist foreign policy 
should focus on strategies of off-shore balancing in order to forestall the emergence of other 
regional hegemons which could contest the United States’ status).  
132  See supra Part II.C.1 (relating the policy implications of the current legal status of the 
use of military force). 
133 See Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93 (repealing the War Powers 
Resolution and substituting a constitutional amendment making a war council responsible 
for deciding to use military force). 
134 See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the processes for amending the Constitution).  See also 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP 
IT, 290–304 (reprint ed. 2011) [hereinafter LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST] (discussing, in the context 
of political campaign contribution reform, the process under the Constitution for amending 
the Constitution and how the approval of an amendment is unlikely due to the necessity of 
super-majorities in both houses of Congress and in the States to secure an amendment and 
the unlikelihood of the alternative of proposing an amendment via another Constitutional 
Convention per Article V of the Constitution). 
135 See, e.g., Vikram Amar, The 20th Century—the Amendments and Populist Century, 47 FED. 
LAW. 32 (May 2000) [hereinafter Amar, Amendments and Populist Century] (explaining the 
historical developments of constitutional amendments and how the amendments may be 
categorized).  See also 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2012) (beginning with “it is the purpose of this joint 
resolution to fulfill the intent of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States and 
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the 
introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the 
continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations” meaning that Congress 
intended to remedy a perceived constitutional pitfall via legislation rather than via a 
constitutional amendment). 
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from the Enlightenment.136  Thus, while proposed before in a different 
fashion, actual effort on a constitutional amendment restructuring the 
War Powers has not occurred.137 
Another feature of certain constitutional amendments is the phrase 
“The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”138  The language can mean that Congress has the power, via 
appropriate legislation, to enforce an amendment.139  The specific 
language varies, but the fact remains that Congress, via legislation, can 
enforce amendments.140  
III.  ANALYSIS 
The current legal status, with reliance on AUMFs rather than as 
previously on declarations of war, bears close analysis, because that status 
is the current one for employing military power and is Part III.A.141  
Following that section, Part III.B.1 presents the analysis of a hypothetical 
case litigating the War Powers Resolution, showing the pitfalls and why 
                                                
136  See U.S. Army War College, 2013 Strategic Conference, supra note 12 (presenting a debate 
between Dr. Daniel Drezner and Mr. Nathan Frier in which Professor Drezner posits that the 
U.S. Constitution is antiquated, contributing to his main argument that the U.S. foreign 
policy is excessively militarized). 
137 See supra Part II.C.2 (outlining the process and pitfalls of amending the Constitution). 
138 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate 
legislation to enforce universal male suffrage); id. amend. XXVI, § 2 (allowing Congress the 
power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the right of citizens eighteen or older to 
vote); id. amend. XIV, § 5 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment); id. amend. XIX (allowing Congress 
the power to pass appropriate legislation to enforce the right of women to vote); id. amend. 
XXIII, § 2 (allowing Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to allow the District 
of Columbia to have electors within the Electoral College); id. amend. XXIV, § 2 (allowing 
Congress the power to pass appropriate legislation to allow the allowance of persons to stand 
to be electors regardless of poll taxes).  All these Amendments contain the language allowing 
Congress to pass legislation enforcing the provisions of the Amendments, albeit that most, if 
not all, of these Amendments deal with the rights of voting, and have not been applied to 
other areas of the law. 
139  See supra note 138 (noting the language of multiple amendments which allow Congress 
to pass statutes to enforce the amendments).  But see generally Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 
S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down portions of the Voting Rights Act which had been upheld 
by South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301).  See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301 (1966), abrogated by Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding that 
Congress has the power, via appropriate legislation, to enforce amendments with the 
language within limits prescribed in the Constitution).  
140  See supra note 138 (noting the multiple constitutional amendments which contain 
language allowing for Congress to enforce the amendments via appropriate legislation). 
141 See infra Part III.A (explaining that authorizations on the use of military force are the 
new legitimate form of Congressional Authorization for the use of military force by the 
President). 
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such a case is mere hypothetical.142  Part III.B.2 follows analyzing the 
Judicial Branch, shifting focus to the other two Branches and their 
shortcomings with the War Powers.143  The final section of analysis will 
consider the resulting policy implications of the current status in Part 
III.C.1 and how an amendment process will serve as a solution in Part 
III.C.2.144 
A. History and Current Status 
Simply put, Congress alone has the power to declare war and fund 
military operations.145  While the President remains Commander-in-Chief, 
Congress formerly showed a degree of sophistication with its declarations 
of war coupled with its power of the purse.146  Congress has the power to 
declare and fund war so that the Executive would not be tempted to make 
war, which subsequent generations confirmed.147  
Currently, however, Congress does not declare war; instead it created 
the AUMFs under the War Powers Resolution to delegate that power to 
the President.148  Taken together, Congress seemingly abdicates from 
declaring war, instead ceding the use of military force to the President’s 
                                                
142 See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the unworkability of litigating the War Powers). 
143 See infra Part III.B.2 (describing the problems with the War Powers in the Legislative 
Branch); infra Part III.B.3 (expounding on the problems of the Executive Branch). 
144 See infra Part III.C (opining that the current legal status enables disastrous policies that 
are costly to the American people and outlining a constitutional amendment). 
145 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the plenary power to declare war 
via Congressional resolution); id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power to appropriate 
funds for military operations).  See also The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 668–89 (1862) (noting 
in the dissent that Congress alone can declare a national or foreign war while the President 
retains powers for defensive action).  
146 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (installing the President as Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces); Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (collecting the historical 
declarations of war by the United States, all of which are constitutional declarations); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (remarking that the Legislature had the power to 
raise armies); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (insisting that the President 
cannot declare war because Congress retains that power, but the President retains the power 
of Commander-in-Chief). 
147 See The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. at 668–89 (noting in the dissent the constitutional 
separation of powers whereby Congress alone can declare war).  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 
24 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the raising of armies is entrusted to the legislature); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that the President, as Executive, 
cannot declare war which is a power reserved to Congress, but retains the power of 
Commander-in-Chief).  See generally David I. Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: 
Protecting Public and Private Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083 (1992) (noting the war powers, 
the constitutional separation thereof, and their effect on public and private liberty). 
148 See War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012) (setting limits which 
the President must follow for ordering military force and providing Congress with 
legislative methods to delegate to the President). 
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discretion.149  This discretionary power results in the current AUMFs, the 
byproducts of the War Powers Resolution.150  The AUMFs—especially the 
first AUMF—continue to show extreme elasticity, allowing the President 
to claim its use against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, despite the fact that the 
attacks on September 11th predate the formation of ISIL.151  Current U.S. 
operations against ISIL in Iraq are grounded in this legal mechanism that 
legitimates those operations, under the original AUMF; with 
contemplations of a new AUMF, Congress essentially vests the President 
with the power to effectively declare war.152  Therefore, the decision to use 
military force remains predicated on future AUMFs, grants of 
Congressional delegation to the President, stemming from the War 
Powers Resolution.153 
                                                
149 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 216–22 (noting the problems with the AUMF 
not needing the limits or approval of Congress). 
150 See Authorization For Use Of Military Force, Pub. L. 107–40, Sept. 18, 2001, 115 Stat. 224 
(enacted) (authorizing by Congress that the President avenge 9/11); Authorization For Use 
Of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution Of 2002, Pub. L 107–243, Oct. 16, 2002, 116 Stat. 
1498 (enacted) (authorizing the President to invade Iraq).  See also Elsea & Weed, Declarations 
of War, supra note 27 (providing the text of both AUMFs which note their compliance with 
the War Powers Resolution). 
151 See Obama, Regarding Iraq, supra note 9 (declaring that the two previous AUMFs 
provided President Obama sufficient legal authority for military operations against ISIL); 
Bruce Ackerman, The War Against ISIS is Unconstitutional, LAWFARE (May 5, 2016, 2:10 PM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/war-against-isis-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/UY8T-
V2UK] (arguing that President Obama’s actions in Iraq against ISIL are unconstitutional); 
Daskal & Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note 53, at 125 (speculating quite foresightedly that 
the Executive Branch would interpret the first AUMF expansively to include threats post-
dating the AUMF); Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking 
on the open-ended interpretation of the AUMF for military actions beyond terrorist forces 
associated with 9/11).  
152 See Exploring the Draft AUMF, AMER. U., supra note 9 (discussing a heretofore non-
enacted draft AUMF dealing with ISIL proposed by President Obama); Poplin, 35 Lawmakers 
Pen Bipartisan AUMF, supra note 104 (noting that lawmakers contemplated a new AUMF for 
combating ISIL).  
153 See, e.g., Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 1298 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (affirming the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers extending to further combatants 
beyond September 11, 2001 and their use for detention by the President).  See also Goldsmith, 
Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (reporting on a Senate committee hearing 
with military members who continued to interpret an open-ended meaning to the AUMF for 
military actions and inadvertently highlighting that the Congressional discussion focuses on 
an AUMF rather than any declaration of war); Daskal & Vladeck, After the AUMF, supra note 
53, at 125 (speculating on an open-ended interpretation of the first AUMF). 
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B. Three Branches or Three Stooges: The Courts, Congress, and the President 
The U.S. Constitution created three branches of government, and all 
three have a role to play in the War Powers.154  Part III.B.1 analyzes the 
courts, supposing a hypothetical lawsuit like Captain Smith’s, and 
outlines the inevitable failure of such a lawsuit.155  Parts III.B.2 and III.B.3 
look at the Legislative and Executive Branches respectively.156  In short, 
Part III.B will show that a change or fundamental re-alignment will not 
emerge from any of the three political branches.157 
1. The Courts 
While the War Powers Resolution gives Congress the power to ponder 
further AUMFs as a matter of legislative course, bringing suit based on the 
Resolution itself is nigh impossible.158  Supposing a hypothetical lawsuit, 
such as Captain Smith’s complaint, there are multiple, insurmountable 
hurdles, but the results are all the same:  dismissal.159   
The first problem is simply of standing which is why Captain Smith’s 
Complaint joins other prior lawsuits in dismissal.160  Even claims that 
                                                
154  See infra Part III.B (outlining the three branches of government and their interactions 
with the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 
(establishing Congress); id. art. II, § 1 (establishing the President as the head of the Executive 
Branch); id. art. III, § 1 (establishing the U.S. Supreme Court). 
155  See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the courts and the inevitable dismissal of lawsuits 
litigating the War Powers Resolution). 
156  See infra Part III.B.2 (scrutinizing the Legislative Branch and their maladies regarding 
the War Powers Resolution and War Powers); infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the Executive 
Branch and its maladies with the War Powers and War Powers Resolution). 
157  See infra Part III.B (outlining that the three political branches and their maladies with 
the War Powers and War Powers Resolution to show that a change in the War Powers will 
not emerge from the Branches). 
158 See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215–28 (1974) 
(holding that a case involving military officers was lacked standing).  See also Lowry v. 
Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that President Reagan’s actions in the 
Persian Gulf in 1986 was non-justiciable); Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a suit to prevent the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a non-justiciable item, despite 
including plaintiffs ranging from parents of soldiers, active duty troops, reservists, and 
congressional members). 
159 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065 (D.D.C. 2016) 
(alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution due to military actions 
against ISIL). 
160 See generally Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (holding that an injury 
must be particular to the plaintiff for there to be standing); Nat’l Treas. Emps. Union v. 
United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427–28 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff must have 
standing, and standing must be established by showing actual injury).  See also Smith v. 
Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (dismissing CPT 
Smith’s Complaint based on lack of standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint 
was not sufficiently concrete or particularized); Lederman, Captain Smith’s Suit, supra note 11 
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being a taxpayer and citizen do not provide standing.161  Even suits by 
members of Congress flounder on standing.162  Even Captain Smith’s 
recital of his legal injuries based on a soldier’s oath of service does not 
grant him sufficient standing, and more modern lawsuits find other 
reasons to dismiss on standing for military members.163  Without standing, 
the lawsuit over the Resolution and use of military force ends only in 
dismissal, and doctrines limiting the Executive Branch are never applied 
to the merits of cases arising from the War Powers; they simply do not 
even get out of the gate.164 
Likewise, standing also proves the bane of most litigation attempts by 
members of Congress.165  Members of Congress can claim to be elected 
stewards of taxpayer money, but this contention fails to grant standing.166  
Moreover, by virtue of their position as members of Congress, courts find 
that those members have the Congressional fora, House and Senate, to 
                                                
(describing how CPT Smith’s suit will fail); Goldsmith, Analysis of Lawsuit, supra note 11 
(arguing that CPT Smith’s lawsuit will fail based on the political question doctrine and 
standing problem). 
161 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216–28 (1974) 
(holding that a case is dismissed due to standing which reservists could not demonstrate as 
either citizens or taxpayers); Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 935 
F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing despite being a taxpayer).  
162 See Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 134 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that a suit to prevent the 2003 
invasion of Iraq was a non-justiciable item despite who the plaintiffs were); Lowry v. Reagan, 
676 F. Supp. 333, 337 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that Congress members could not bring suit over 
President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf).  But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. at 216–28 (holding actual military reservists members lacked standing). 
163 See Compl., Smith v. Obama, No. 1:16-cv-00843, 2016 WL 2347065, at *2–*3 (D.D.C. 
2016),  (alleging President Obama’s violation of the War Powers Resolution constitute a legal 
injury to Captain Smith given that the effects of President Obama’s orders violate a soldier’s 
oath).  See also Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D.D.C. 1990) (applying the Ash test from 
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S. Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), which provides for the private 
cause of action within a statute, and the court ruling that Ange did have standing even as 
the court dismissed the lawsuit on other grounds); Smith v. Obama, CV 16-843 (CKK), 2016 
WL 6839357, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (ruling that CPT Smith’s suit is dismissed because 
CPT Smith lacked standing because his specific legal injury in his complaint was not 
sufficiently concrete or particularized).  But see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 
216–28 (holding that a case is dismissed due to standing which must show actual injury 
despite the plaintiffs being reservist and active-duty soldiers in their suit). 
164 But see Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 112, at 32–33 (arguing that there are four 
cases reducing presidential plenary power, but not acknowledging how the standing 
problem prevents these doctrines being used in the realm of litigating the War Powers 
Resolution). 
165 See Doe, 323 F.3d at 134 (holding that members of congress could not litigate the 2003 
invasion of Iraq). 
166 See id. (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to contest the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq in the courts).  
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contest executive decisions; therefore, the courts are closed.167  Even one 
commentator’s assertion that Congress can and should more energetically 
confront the Executive Branch by judicial contest fails to overcome the 
courts’ presumption that members of Congress should confine their 
efforts solely to their special fora.168  Even when multiple members of 
Congress commit or join a lawsuit as plaintiffs, mere numbers fail to 
convert quantity into standing.169  Thus, to simply litigate the War Powers, 
even members of Congress lack standing.170 
Yet suppose the standing requirement were somehow (mythically) 
solved; were that to happen, the courts still have other doctrinal ways to 
dismiss the suit regardless of the plaintiffs, inter alia doctrines like political 
question.171  Consequently, courts will not review certain Executive 
                                                
167 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the 
congressional forum to express its displeasure with policy, and that such suits are barred by 
standing and political question doctrines); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (DC 
Cir. 1983) (holding that Congress cannot use the courts under the War Powers Resolution to 
review Executive actions); Kucinich v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 110, 125 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s policy over 
Libya because the Congressman had a congressional forum to challenge presidential power); 
Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that President Reagan’s actions in the Persian Gulf were 
non-justiciable even for Congress members when 100 members joined the suit as plaintiffs). 
168 Compare Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30 (holding that Congress lacked standing and that they 
could pass bills to remedy the dismissal of their suit); and Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 
(holding that Congress cannot use the courts to review Executive actions on the use of 
military force); and Kucinich, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (holding that a Congressman lacked 
standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military force in Libya because the 
Congressman had a congressional forum for political questions); and Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 
337 (holding that even 100 members of Congress joined to the suit as plaintiffs did not grant 
justiciability), with Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress 
should more vigorously challenge encroachment by the executive Branch via lawsuits). 
169 See Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (noting that even having 100 members of Congress joined 
to the suit as plaintiffs did not grant justiciability).  See also Walters, War Powers Resolution, 
supra note 45 (reporting on the failure of a lawsuit, which was Lowry v. Reagan, against then-
President Reagan to enforce the War Powers Resolution). 
170 See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (holding that the War Powers Resolution could not be 
used by Congress in litigation to review Executive actions); Kucinich, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 125 
(holding that a Congressman lacked standing to challenge President Obama’s use of military 
force in Libya); Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 337 (holding that even when 100 members of Congress 
joined the suit as plaintiffs that they lacked standing for purposes of justiciability). 
171 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 229 (1974) (Douglas 
J., dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from 
the courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches 
to resolve, viz., the so-called political question”).  See generally Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
829–30 (1997) (holding that Congress has the congressional forum to express its displeasure 
with policy, and that such suits are bared by standing and political question doctrines); 
Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (ruling that Congress lacked standing and 
was also barred by the political question doctrine of challenging a President’s foreign policy 
decisions because the President determines the national interest, thus dismissing the suit); 
§ 3534.1 Political Questions—Political Issues and Separation of Powers, 13C FED. PRAC. & 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol52/iss3/2
2018] Perpetual Warfare 487 
policies, meaning that lawsuits cannot change those polices, which 
includes any use of military force.172  Should the political question doctrine 
fail, the courts can also fall back on either the suit lacking ripeness or being 
moot, either of which makes justiciability impossible.173  Mootness can 
especially be a problem when the courts work more slowly compared to 
the swift use of military force.174  In short, other doctrinal hurdles exist to 
bar any potential lawsuit involving the War Powers Resolution, 
essentially rendering the resolution dead-letter law.175 
The doctrines above are also not the only bars to a lawsuit, but rather 
a foretaste of doctrinal hurdles which dismiss a mythical lawsuit.176  
Moreover, the court could rely upon other doctrines, such as state secrets 
or basic deference to the military, and the President’s actions under the 
                                                
PROC. JURIS. § 3534.1 (3d ed.) (outlining the contours and limits of the political question 
doctrine, which makes some controversies, typically between the executive and legislative 
Branches, non-judicial controversies because they involve a question of public policy, and 
are thus political questions determined by the Branches). 
172 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 194–201 (2012) (noting 
problems associated with the political question doctrine and that political question doctrine 
dismisses lawsuits).  See, e.g., Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that 
Congress lacked standing and was also barred by the political question doctrine of 
challenging a President’s foreign policy decisions); Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356–57 (holding that 
Congress cannot review Executive use of military force under the War Powers Resolution 
using the courts).  See also Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 229 (Douglas J., 
dissenting) (speaking on the issue of political question, which is “[a]lso used to bar from the 
courts questions which . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two coordinate Branches to 
resolve, viz., the so-called political question” meaning that the lawsuit would also have failed 
based on the political question doctrine); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–17 (1962) 
(explaining the contours of the political question doctrine); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 
1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (disposing of a challenge to the President’s Vietnam War policy based 
on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution legitimating Executive policy). 
173  See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496–501 (1969) (explaining the mootness 
doctrine); Conyers v. Reagan, 765 F.2d 1124, 1127–29 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that mootness 
made the lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already 
occurred and continued occupation did not present a recurring offense which is an exception 
to the mootness doctrine); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 510 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that 
the controversy was not ripe despite plaintiff having standing). 
174 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 496–500 (holding that due to mootness, certain political questions 
are outside federal subject matter jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and by extension its 
subordinate courts); Conyers, 765 F.2d at 1127–29 (holding that mootness rendered the 
lawsuit to prevent the invasion of Grenada non-justiciable because it had already occurred 
making the controversy non-justiciable); Ange, 752 F. Supp. 509 at 510–11 (holding that the 
controversy was not ripe). 
175 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the bars to litigation, including the Feres Doctrine, State 
Secrets Doctrine, in addition to the problems related to standing); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra 
note 18, at 271 (remarking that Posner the Younger declared the War Powers Resolution to 
be “dead letter law”). 
176 See supra note 175 (referencing the multitude of doctrinal bars which all lead to 
dismissal of lawsuits litigating the War Power Resolution and the use of military force). 
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War Powers, both of which mean that the courts would recoil from 
judging a suit on the merits and instead merely dismiss it.177  For a soldier, 
such as Captain Smith, to bring suit and to find standing, the courts could 
always turn to the Feres Doctrine, cloaking the War Powers in civil 
immunity from military members’ suits by making the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, immune from suits from military petitioners.178   
All these doctrines, ranging from standing to political question to 
mootness to deference to military action to the other doctrines illustrate 
the nigh impossibility of pursuing a case against the use of military force 
under the War Powers Resolution, inevitably leading to dismissal.179  With 
these hurdles in place, lawsuits cannot reference other case law limiting 
the Executive Branch, and attempts to litigate the War Powers will fail to 
                                                
177 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992) (holding that an injury 
must be particularized to the plaintiff for there to be standing and remarking on the 
deference to military necessity); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–24 (1944) 
(explaining deference to national security and military necessity meets strict scrutiny of 
racial classifications); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1953) (holding that 
military secrets, if involved, should not be discoverable in a civil suit).  Compare Robert E. 
Barnsby, So Long, and Thanks for All the Secrets: A Response to Professor Telman, 63 ALA. L. REV. 
667, 668–70 (2011) (replying to an article stating that the states secrets doctrine, which forbids 
lawsuits based on secrecy includes the Totten doctrine, which Professor Telman maintains 
(and teaches) is a purely contract doctrine dealing with the non-justiciability of a secret 
agreement to spy between President Lincoln and his agent with secrecy as an inferred term), 
with D.A. Jeremy Telman, On the Conflation of the State Secrets Privilege and the Totten Doctrine, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191656 [https://perma.cc/PNH5-
D42N] (explaining that the state secrets privilege cannot be conflated with the Totten 
Doctrine of contracts which deals solely with inferred terms of secrecy, forbidding 
justiciability of the contract apart from any state secrets); and D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable 
Abuses:  Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429, 433-39 (2011) 
(explaining problems with the expanded state secrets doctrine and its morphing from a 
doctrine centered around evidentiary to a doctrine of dismissal as well as analyzing the 
misuse of the Totten Doctrine).  But see BACEVICH, LIMITS OF POWER, supra note 90, at 86 
(observing the problems related to United States v. Reynolds, in which subsequent 
declassification showed that the claim of disclosure of national secrets and threat to national 
security proved unfounded and merely hid embarrassment of a military mishap). 
178 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (introducing the Feres Doctrine 
barring civil suits from members of the military or their widows when the injury arises from 
conditions endemic to military service); Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 881–83 
(C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (holding that the Commander-in-Chief is a part of the chain-of-
command and thus has a position within the military).  See also United States v. Shearer, 473 
U.S. 52 (1985) (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars a civil suit of wrongful death); Smith v. 
United States, 196 F.3d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Feres Doctrine bars a tort 
sexual assault civil suit between members of the military); The Feres Doctrine and Sexual 
Assault, 50 TR. 54 (March 2014) (detailing the Feres Doctrine and its bar to civil suits, 
especially in the context of sexual assault). 
179 See supra Part III.B (outlining the problems with pursuing legal action via the courts, 
with multiple bars including standing and other judicial doctrines which lead to dismissal 
of the lawsuit without any consideration of the merits of the lawsuit). 
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reach a consideration of the merits or limiting doctrines on the use of 
military force.180  In short, because of the standing question and multiple 
bars to litigation, the courts cannot and will not litigate the use of military 
force under the War Powers Resolution, rendering the War Powers 
Resolution dead-letter law.181  Thus, the case of a mythical lawsuit is just 
that, such as pursued by Captain Smith, the courts will simply dismiss, 
meaning that the courts are no venue to litigate the War Powers or War 
Powers Resolution or provide any correction.182 
2. Congressional Abdication 
If the War Powers are truly a political question, as the courts maintain, 
then part of the blame lies with Congress.183  Part of the problem is that 
Congress has only toyed with fixing the War Powers Resolution using its 
normal legislative capabilities, or considered outright repeal.184  Other 
members of Congress have settled for incremental modification, requiring 
the President to consult Congress more frequently and return to a more 
consultative system for using military force, but without results.185  Nor 
                                                
180 Compare supra Part III.B (indicating the problems of litigating the war powers with 
various dispositive bars to litigation), with generally Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 
112 (arguing that there are four cases reducing presidential plenary power, but not 
acknowledging how the standing problem prevents these doctrines from being used in the 
realm of litigating the War Powers Resolution, meaning that the doctrines cannot be used to 
argue about the central issue of military force, making Edelson’s paper into an insistence for 
the status quo system). 
181 See supra Part III.B (analyzing the three branches).  See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 
1039, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing a challenge to the President’s Vietnam War policy); 
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 271 (noting that the War Powers Resolution is 
effectively “dead letter law”). 
182 See supra Part III.B.1 (showing the path of a mythical lawsuit and the array of bars to 
litigation over the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, leading to the conclusion that 
pursuing such a course in the courts is a fool’s errand and leads to dismissal of all suits 
involving the War Powers or War Powers Resolution). 
183 See Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. at 229 (noting in the dissent that the 
political question is a question “[w]hich . . . the Constitution . . . left to the other two 
coordinate Branches to resolve”).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 273 
(observing that the two political branches, Congress and the Presidency, may disagree which 
is a key part of the deliberations for using military force). 
184 See generally Kasperowicz, GOP Bill, supra note 46 (recounting attempts to repeal the 
War Powers Resolution by various members of the GOP); Schulte, Defeat the Repeal, supra 
note 46 (recounting an attempt to repeal the War Powers Resolution); Walters, War Powers 
Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on concerns regarding the War Powers Resolution and a 
failure of a lawsuit against then-President Reagan). 
185 See Walters, War Powers Resolution, supra note 45 (reporting on discontent regarding the 
War Powers Resolution and a failure of a lawsuit to enforce the War Powers act).  See also 
Kaine, Reforming the War Powers Resolution, supra note 47 (explaining his experiences while 
working in Congress to amend the War Powers Resolution and his proposed changes to form 
a military council and the subsequent failure to do so); GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, 
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have Congressional-led lawsuits led to anything; moreover, many of these 
lawsuits have partisan roots.186 
Congress also deserves a degree of blame for the current AUMF status 
via continued funding of the use of military force.187  Funding war is a 
Congressional power, one which Congress could potentially withhold 
and end some use of military force, even while troops are engaged.188  Yet, 
to contend plausibly that Congress would cease funding with deployed 
troops in the field, for instance, utterly ignores the political problems of 
that choice and ignores the political costs associated with funding, making 
sole control of funding an ineffective check on the Executive Branch.189  
Moreover, Congress continues to vote for funding for military operations, 
tacitly approving the President’s actions.190  Between continuing to fund 
                                                
at 273 (observing that the disagreement between the two political branches is a key part of 
the deliberations for using military force); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 
690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment which forms a war council composed of 
members of the Executive and Legislative Branches while repealing the War Powers 
Resolution); MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 48, at Introduction XIX–
XXIV (arguing that the current constitutional political system and Congress, in particular, 
cannot work due to paralysis caused by the Republican party and a weakened Democratic 
party which has shifted rightward due to Republican pressure). 
186 See supra Part III.B.1 (describing problems associated with standing with Congress-
initiated lawsuits among other problems such as the political question doctrine which serve 
to bar Congress-initiated lawsuits over the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).  See 
also supra note 106 (noting the partisan nature of the lawsuits with the exception of Kucinch 
v. Obama). 
187 See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (noting that Congress’ 
continued funding of military operations acts as a tacit acknowledgement and agreement 
with the President’s use of military force).  See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44 
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that funding from Congress as part of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
includes Congressional recognition of Executive acts).  
188 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress the power of the purse, i.e., Congress 
votes for funding military operations and appropriations for defense); YOO, CRISIS AND 
COMMAND, supra note 43, at 144–59 (arguing that Congress retains the power of the purse, 
and can fund or not fund military power, regardless of the political choice).  
189 Compare YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 159 (arguing that Congress retains 
the power of the purse and that a poor political choice does not equal a violation of the 
Constitution), with GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 203–04 (questioning Yoo’s 
argument that the War Powers are not a restraint on the presidency, and this argument 
ignores the complex history surrounding the War Powers Resolution and its adoption).  See 
also SCHULTZ, Domestic Politics, supra note 103, at 489–90 (remarking on the “rally around the 
flag effect” in which a country’s leader receives increased political support when the country 
becomes involved in military conflict, making domestic political opposition a fringe stance 
as opposed to one tempering the pursuit of military action). 
190 See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking that when 
Congress continues to fund military operations, this funding acts as a tacit 
acknowledgement).  See also Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042–44 (holding that funding via the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution meant that Congress recognized and supported Executive acts in 
Vietnam). 
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wars and lack of legislative initiative on the war powers, Congress has 
effectively abdicated its position, and has not adopted a way that would 
make the use of military force a more consultative act between Executive 
and Legislation, which this Note proposes.191  Therefore, Congress’ supine 
stance, partisanship, and other maladies do not auger that Congressional 
action will change the policy of perpetual war.192 
3. Executive Overreach in War Powers and Perpetual Undeclared War 
The Executive Branch has, in the past, taken advantage of 
Congressional abdication.193  While arguments exist that the President, not 
Congress, declares war, the Executive Branch has, with essential 
Congressional abdication, further increased its control of the War Powers 
to a nigh monopoly.194  Moreover, the President’s counsel in the OLC has 
argued for even more ways that the President can deploy military force 
without explicit Congressional approval, relying on the tacit approval via 
funding bills or redefining the use of military force under a certain 
threshold as less than war.195  Furthermore, the President enjoys the 
benefits of all the dismissed lawsuits challenging the War Powers and War 
                                                
191 See Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (noting that Congress’ 
continued funding of military operations equals tacit acknowledgement and support of the 
President’s military policy).  See also GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 241–42 (arguing 
that previously, use of military force was a consultative process conducted by both the 
Legislative and Executive Branches); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93 
(proposing a constitutional amendment to create a war council as a more consultative model 
for employing military force). 
192 See supra Part III.B.2 (demonstrating that a moribund Congress will neither repeal nor 
amend the War Powers Resolution while continuing to fund the military meaning that 
Congress is not an engine to change the current military policy). 
193 See Frost, Congress in Court, supra note 105, at 968 (arguing that Congress, via lawsuits, 
should more vigorously challenge Executive Branch encroachment and thereby more 
vigorously assert itself in government policy). 
194 See YOO, AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, supra note 27, at 144–52 (arguing that the original textual 
meaning of “declare” from the Founding period which allows Congress to declare war 
should not be construed to mean that Congress has the sole power to initiate war).  See also 
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240–42 (noting that Presidents have treated 
authorizations from Congress as votes of confidence in pre-decided polices rather than 
necessary grants of permission).  
195 See generally O.L.C., Libya, supra note 111 (opining to President Barack Obama that the 
use of military force did not require a declaration of war or prior approval from Congress 
due to the low scale of the use of military power); O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 (opining 
about the second AUMF and Presidential Authority, the national interest, and presidential 
discretion for the 2003 Invasion of Iraq); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra note 111 (opining on presidential 
discretion and use of military force for the 2003 invasion of Iraq); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 
111 (opining on President George W. Bush’s presidential discretion and powers against 
terrorism with the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra note 50 (opining to use the military in 
Somalia in 1992 to President Bill Clinton). 
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Powers Resolution; because courts dismiss, the President does not have to 
alter policy.196 
This continuing trend, remaining a mostly bipartisan view of the 
Executive Branch and its discretionary powers, also runs counter to a 
conjecture that the decision-making process for use of military force is still 
a system thought to be working with only a few bad apples.197  Such a 
conjecture also ignores how judicial opinions enshrine the power of the 
President to set the national interest and foreign policy powers.198  
Contrary to pre-WWII policy, the President’s use of the first AUMF 
expands beyond the inherent defensive powers of the President to make 
offensive actions a key foreign policy principle. 199  Moreover, the 
                                                
196 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the process of litigation of the War Powers and War 
Powers Resolution and demonstrating that all suits end in dismissal meaning that none of 
the suits, in turn, will affect policy).  
197 See Edelson, Breaking the Cycle, supra note 129, at 32–33 (arguing that there is more that 
the courts and Congress can do within the framework of the War Powers Resolution which 
will improve the decision-making process for employing military force); supra note 117 
(outlining the expansive powers of the Executive and the President’s broad powers for the 
use of military force, including undeclared wars).  See generally O.L.C., Iraq II, supra note 111 
(opining to President George W. Bush about the second AUMF and Presidential Authority, 
the national interest, and presidential discretion for the 2003 invasion); O.L.C., Iraq I, supra 
note 111 (opining about presidential discretion and use of military force against Iraq for 
George W. Bush); O.L.C., Terrorists, supra note 111 (opining on presidential discretion and 
powers to conduct operations against terrorism per the first AUMF); O.L.C., Somalia, supra 
note 50 (opining to President Bill Clinton about the use of the military in Somalia within 
presidential discretion); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (opining that changing the 
person of the President will not change the U.S. policy of perpetual war). 
198 See KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 3, at 39–40 (writing prior to 1994 that Americans 
were “[a] people brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition,” and seeing that 
the U.S. Senate exercised a large sway in deciding the national interest, via appropriations 
for the military, leading to a concentration of policies focused on acquiring territory in 
continental North American and foregoing territorial battling in Europe).  See generally 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (articulating the primacy 
of the President in the realm of foreign policy and the President’s role in defining the national 
interest as the constitutional representative of the United States in foreign affairs); Alsabri v. 
Obama, 764 F. Supp. 2d 60, 62 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd, 684 F.3d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (affirming 
the AUMF’s grant of broad war powers and particularly their use for detention by the 
President).   
199 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–22 (1936) 
(noting that the President is primary in the realm of foreign policy and the President defines 
the national interest).  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 8 (noting the President’s oath to 
preserve, protect, and defend); The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635, 659–66 (1862) (holding that 
the President can still order military force absent Congress’ declaration of war when a state 
of belligerency exists and that this belligerency does not require Congressional say-so to exist 
to be recognized as requiring the use of military force); Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential 
Oath, the American National Interest and a Call for Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2004) 
(arguing that the President’s oath endows the President with certain national security 
powers in order to fulfill that oath); Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the 
Preemptive Use of Military Force, WASHINGTON Q., Spring 2003, at 89, 90–91 (detailing the 
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possibility of impeachment does not exist to check the Executive Branch’s 
continued overreach.200  But while the President sits atop the hierarchy of 
the three branches of the United States government to determine the 
national interest within its foreign policy powers, reducing the use of 
American military force from an interbranch deliberation to an 
interagency deliberation within the Executive Branch has not led to better 
policy, systematic recalibration, or unmitigated success in war; that policy, 
instead, is the result of the current state of affairs with the War Powers 
Resolution.201  Even a change in the Presidency seems unlikely to change 
the current policy situation.202  In short, given the benefits of 
Congressional abdication, bars of litigation, and discretion to use military 
force, the President is extremely unlikely to change a system which 
benefits the Executive.203  Thus, change to the perpetual war policy is 
unlikely to emerge from the Judiciary, the Legislature, or the Executive.204 
C. Effects of the Problem and Changing the Situation 
As with any legal status, inquiries about the results of the AUMFs and 
their effect on the United States are important questions, to which the 
                                                
Caroline Doctrine and its limited parameters allowing for preemptive self-defense); WILLIAM 
& MARY U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting Professor Stephen Walt,  a realist, who 
describes the use of military force as a magic button which the President can use to make 
problems in non-strategic areas go away for a paltry millions of dollars).  
200 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 240 (noting that impeachment is a poor 
possibility to call a President to heel on overreach). 
201 See id. at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions to employ military force, 
changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to a deliberation within the 
Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to questionable military results).  
See also infra Part III (analyzing the problematic policy results of the current status of AUMF 
and the War Powers Resolution). 
202 See Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing that a change in presidents will 
not change that the United States continues perpetual war); Greenwald, Brexit, supra note 
117 (arguing that the change in Presidents from Obama to Trump has placed President 
Trump in charge of a perpetual war machine which was discounted by some commentators 
because of President Obama’s charisma and apparent even-handedness); Emmons, Thanks 
Obama, supra note 117 (noting the policy of perpetual war and the arsenal of nuclear 
weapons, drone program, et al which President Trump now controls under the Executive 
Branch). 
203 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the litigation of the War Powers and War Powers 
Resolution, leading to the conclusion that courts dismiss all suits involving those subjects); 
supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing Congress’ inaction to either repeal or amend the War Powers 
Resolution while continuing to fund the military, leading to a conclusion that Congress is 
paralyzed); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the Executive Branch and demonstrating that the 
Executive Branch, with its discretion over military force via the AUMF, is the clear driver of 
this policy unfettered by the other two Branches). 
204 See supra Part III.B (arguing that neither the courts, based on bars to litigation, nor 
Congress, based on its paralysis, nor the Executive, based on received benefits, will end or 
modify the policy of perpetual war).  
Dechert: Perpetual Warfare: Proposing a New American Constitutional Amendm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018
494 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52 
answers are not positive.205  The current state of affairs encourages further 
Executive Branch encroachment, with the abdication if not 
encouragement of Congressional members whose districts are so 
dependent on spending associated with the AUMF and perpetual war.206  
Such spending incentivizes and reinforces the current system, from which 
America’s geopolitical position insulates it from more of the baneful 
effects.207  Instead of a time when peace and war were entirely distinct 
phases, a self-reinforcing, permanent state of war predicated on a 
pernicious focus on interventionism is in place.208 
Given the resultant problems of the current status, many have thought 
to change it.209  But neither the courts nor Congress are viable avenues to 
change the current status of the War Powers Resolution and AUMFs’ 
                                                
205 See WGBH Forum, Washington Rules: The Path to Permanent War, YOUTUBE (March 31, 
2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc2TJ76dcYs  [hereinafter Bacevich, 
Washington Rules] (presenting Professor Andrew Bacevich who argues that military 
engagement has become the de facto response of American foreign policy, and that the 
Department of Defense is an instrument of oversees power projection, vice homeland 
defense). 
206 See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (critiquing the large amount of 
money appropriated to the “War on Terror” in the pursuit of security with dubious results).  
See generally THORPE, AMERICAN WARFARE STATE, supra note 37 (arguing that the explosion 
of military funding has disproportionately increased pro-war pressures upon congressional 
districts and states with less diversified economies, leading to support and congressional 
abdication). 
207 See Greenwald, Decade’s Biggest Scam, supra note 123 (questioning the large amount of 
money spent in pursuit of security in the “War on Terror” resulting in questionable results 
and questionable domestic effects); Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing 
persuasively that a change in presidents will not change that the United States continues 
perpetual war).  See also William & Mary U., Stephen Walt, supra note 126 (presenting 
Professor Stephen Walt, a realist, who argues that America’s geopolitical position, 
surrounded by weak countries and two oceans, and America’s great wealth provide enough 
isolation to insulate America from the persistent foreign policy problems stemming from an 
often incorrect foreign policy elite lacking accountability for its numerous failures, as 
evidenced by a dictum misattributed to Otto von Bismark “there is a special kind of 
Providence which watches out for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America”). 
208 Compare Greenwald, Key Democrats, supra note 112 (arguing persuasively that a change 
in presidents will not change that the United States continues perpetual war), and Bacevich, 
Washington Rules, supra note 205 (presenting Professor Andrew Bacevich who argues that 
military engagement has become America’s de facto foreign policy), and Emmons, 
Neverending War, supra note 1 (arguing that U.S. military engagement in the Middle East is 
essentially a permanent foundation of American foreign policy), with KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY, 
supra note 3, at 39–40 (writing at the end of the Cold War that Americans were “[a] people 
brought up in the belief that peace is the normal condition” and denoting that war and peace 
were previously viewed as distinct and separate conditions).  
209 See supra Part II.C (presenting the results of the current legal status for the use of military 
power); supra Part III.B.2 (noting Congress’ failures to change the War Powers Resolution 
amid flirtations with repealing it wholesale). 
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current status.210  Nor is the Executive Branch likely to self-regulate.211  
Given these problems, the solution appears:  an amendment to the 
Constitution, an admittedly tough proposition.212  An amendment is an 
extremely difficult proposal, requiring a super-majority in Congress and 
the States, or alternatively, a new Constitutional Convention which has 
never happened.213  Such an amendment would work above and 
alongside the War Powers Resolution, and focus on four major items:  (1) 
allowing the courts to be used to litigate the use of military force in a 
manner which is foreseeable and scalable, limiting the power to bring a 
lawsuit solely to the President and Congress; (2) requiring Congress and 
the President to deliberate in an interbranch manner regarding the use of 
military force; (3) requiring Congress to avoid tacit approval by having 
periodic, public votes reaffirming the use of military force and paying for 
it; and (4) providing ways for Congress or the President, via the courts, to 
enforce the amendment.214  In short, rather than an amendment 
                                                
210 See supra Part III.B (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers 
Resolution, the failures of Congress to change the War Powers Resolution or to attempt any 
other actions beyond abdication, and the Executive Branch’s exploitation of the situation).  
211 See GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions 
to employ military force, changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to 
a deliberation within the Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to 
questionable military results and noting that the Executive Branch is unlikely to self-correct 
as opposed to being balanced by the other Branches).  See also supra Part III (reviewing the 
Executive Branch and its nigh monopolization of interagency decision-making for using 
military force and arguing that the President is unlikely to change the current status quo). 
212 See Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (indicating that a most serious 
approach is the proposal of a constitutional amendment to solve a problem).  See also LESSIG, 
REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at  290–304 (providing an overview of the process under the 
Constitution for amending the Constitution and the difficulties of having super-majorities in 
both houses of Congress and in the States to secure an amendment, meaning that a proposed 
amendment will be extremely unlikely despite the other alternative of another Constitutional 
Convention provided in Article V of the Constitution); Amar, Amendments and Populist 
Century, supra note 135 (explaining the historical developments of constitutional 
amendments and how the amendments may be categorized as well as noting the few 
numbers of amendments). 
213 See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the processes for amending the Constitution in which 
amendments can emerge from either two-thirds of the States or from Congress); Miksha, War 
Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (noting that proposing a constitutional amendment is 
the most serious approach to solving the question of the War Powers).  See also LESSIG, 
REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at  290–304 (providing an overview of the process to amend 
the Constitution and the difficulties of having super majorities in both houses of Congress 
and in the States to secure an amendment, meaning that a proposed amendment will be 
extremely unlikely despite the other alternative of another Constitutional Convention 
provided in Article V of the Constitution which requires a super majority of the states).  
214 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers 
Resolution).  See also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that 
funding for the Vietnam War attached to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution meant Congressional 
recognition and support for President Johnson’s Vietnam War); supra Part III.B.2 (noting 
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reaffirming rights or expanding the popular nature of society, this 
amendment must re-entangle the Legislative and Executive Branches 
when approaching the important task of using military force.215 
When appraising the War Powers and checks on their modern use 
compared to former declarations of war, one comes to the conclusion that 
the courts do not work, Congress functions even less, and only the 
Executive Branch decides on the use of military force while Congress 
pays.216  The existing legal status supports the current interventionist 
policy at the Executive Branch’s behest, despite the resultant problems.217  
Given the problems and the non-functional solutions, the answer is clear:  
in the light of failure of checks and balances, a new constitutional 
amendment is required to remedy the dysfunction and produce better 
policy outcomes for the United States.218 
                                                
Congress’ failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations with repealing it 
wholesale); Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (asserting that 
continued funding of military operations is a tacit acknowledgement); supra Part III.B.3 
(noting continued executive encroachment on issues of war powers and the use of military 
force); supra Part II.C.2 (noting the path of amendments and that certain amendments have 
sections and clauses allowing for Congressional enforcement via appropriate legislation). 
215 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing past court cases and arguing that the courts cannot be 
used to litigate the War Powers Resolution).  See also supra Part III.B.2 (noting Congressional 
failures to change the War Powers Resolution and act as a check on Executive overreach); 
Goldsmith, Quick Reactions on Hearing on AUMF, supra note 52 (remarking that continued 
funding of military operations equals tacit acknowledgement); supra Part III.B.3 (noting 
continued executive encroachment on issues of war powers and the use of military force); 
supra Part III.C (outlining the resultant policy effects based on the current legal status); 
GRIFFIN, LONG WARS, supra note 18, at 242–44 (noting that the post-WWII decisions to employ 
military force, changing from a deliberation between Presidents and Congress to a 
deliberation within the Executive Branch’s national security framework, have led to 
questionable military results in the interagency use of military force under the Executive 
Branch). 
216 See supra Part III.A (outlining the problems of the War Powers Resolution).  See also 
supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures of using the courts to litigate the War Powers 
Resolution, noting Congress’s failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations 
with repealing it wholesale, and noting continued executive encroachment on issues of War 
Powers and the use of military force). 
217 See supra Part III.C (discussing the resultant policy effects based on the current legal 
status, which enables further interventionism based on the use of military force as well as 
the process of analyzing the path to amending the Constitution). 
218 See supra Part III.A (outlining the current problems associated the War Powers 
Resolution including the current AUMFs).  See also supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the failures 
of using the courts to litigate the War Powers Resolution); supra Part III.B.2 (noting 
Congress’s failures to change the War Powers Resolution amid flirtations with repealing it 
wholesale); supra Part III.B.3 (noting continued Executive encroachment on issues of War 
Powers and the use of military force); supra Part III.C (discussing the resultant policy effects 
based on the current legal status, which enables further interventionism based on the use of 
military force and arguing in the absence of workable solutions, the ultimate solution, a 
constitutional amendment, is the only working answer to the problem of the War Powers). 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The first section presents the proposed constitutional amendment.219  
The second section, concluding this Note’s contribution, is a commentary 
of the proposed amendment.220 
A. Proposed Constitutional Amendment 
Thus the amendment should read as follows: 
§ 1 The sustained use of military force must be a decision of the 
Congress and the President.  Both branches, in total, must meet 
and discuss the use of military force beyond thirty days.  The 
President, while Commander-in-Chief, cannot employ offensive 
military force or declare war on the President’s own 
recognizance. 
§ 2 Congressional representatives, either representative or 
senator, shall have standing to litigate this measure if duly 
authorized as a delegation from Congress based on joint 
resolution.  This measure will be decided on the merits of the 
case presented by Congress before dismissal. 
§ 3 Congress must periodically reaffirm the use of military force 
and vote the levies to pay for the use of military force.  These 
periodic reaffirmations must be public, open, joint, and 
recorded.  The President may have recourse to the courts to 
enforce this provision. 
§ 4 Presidential failure to abide under this article is grounds for 
impeachment, and follows the normal procedure in the 
Constitution. 
§ 5 The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.221 
                                                
219 See infra Part IV.A (putting forth a constitutional amendment making Congress 
responsible for declarations of war and for periodic renewals to continue the use of military 
force while requiring the President to plan the use of military force and linking both Branches 
in an arrangement allowing either Branch to turn to the Courts to enforce the duties of each 
Branch in order to provide an enforcement mechanism within the amendment). 
220 See infra Part IV.B (addressing concerns with the constitutional amendment with the 
intent of trying to restore an interbranch deliberation model for the use of military force 
based on a judicial pathway to force the Executive and Legislative Branches to act in concert 
when deliberating the use of military force). 
221 This amendment is the author’s contribution, embodying the intent of recreating an 
interbranch system and creating a judicial pathway for either Congress or the President to 
enforce the terms of this amendment and pre-supposing the repeal of the first AUMF.  See 
supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problem of Congressional abdication); supra Part III 
(analyzing the effects and resulting policy of the current status of the use of military force 
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B. Commentary 
A proposed constitutional amendment improving the constitutional 
War Powers must contain several parts, which solve the problems 
associated with the War Powers Resolution.222  A constitutional 
amendment is a major step, because proposing a constitutional 
amendment is also an admission that a simple legislative fix for the War 
Powers does not exist, and the current situation will not change from 
efforts emerging from the three Branches.223  Attempts to amend the War 
Powers Resolution, attempts at outright repeal, and actions of the 
Executive Branch, regardless of political party, to circumvent the War 
Powers Resolution all support a conclusion that a simple legislative fix 
does not exist.224  Moreover, constitutional amendments are rare and 
extremely difficult requiring super-majorities, but because a legislative fix 
is not possible, an amendment appears an even more unlikely option, but 
is the solution when all three branches are the problem.225 
The first portion of the proposed amendment is that it must restate 
with vigor that the decision to use military force is not a decision solely 
                                                
and process of amending the Constitution); supra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the problems related 
to the use of military force related to the President and the problems of Executive overreach 
by the President in order to use military force, in effect obviating the power of declaring war 
vested with Congress); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the bars to litigation and the probable 
dismissal of any lawsuit litigating the War Powers Resolution or the use of military force).  
See also supra note 138 (noting the language and existence of provisions within constitutional 
amendments allowing Congress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce an amendment, 
meaning that the language could also allow for the use of the War Powers Resolution or 
amendments thereto as enforcing legislation). 
222 See supra note 218 (analyzing the legal status and problems related to the War Powers 
Resolution and the constitutional War Powers). 
223 See supra Part III (describing that the use of military force, previously an interbranch 
decision, has become something that cannot be fixed solely by the Judicial Branch because of 
the various bars to litigation, cannot be fixed by the legislature due to partisan rancor and 
Congressional abdication, and cannot be fixed by sole action of the Executive Branch which 
has monopolized the use of military force as an interagency decision). 
224 See supra note 124 (noting the funding from the government related to the “War on 
Terror” and its effects both on private markets and security-related companies as well as a 
detrimental effect on politics and enabling of certain policies via incentivizing Congressional 
inaction or abdication). 
225 See U.S. CONST. art. V (detailing how to amend the Constitution by either an 
amendment emerging from Congress or via a new Constitutional Convention called by two-
thirds of the States); Miksha, War Powers Resolution, supra note 47, at 691 (noting that 
proposing a constitutional amendment is the most serious approach to solving a problem).  
See also LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST, supra note 134, at 290–304 (presenting an overview of 
amending the Constitution requiring super-majorities in both houses of Congress and in the 
States to secure an amendment, or the other alternative of another Constitutional Convention 
provided in Article V of the Constitution which requires a super majority of the states, both 
of which are extremely difficult hurdles to overcome in order to amend the Constitution). 
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endowed to the President.226  Traditionally, the decision to use military 
force has been a bilateral decision involving both the Executive and 
Legislative Branches.227  This recognition means that a section of the 
amendment must cement that the normal process for deciding the use of 
military force must be a consultative decision involving Congress and not 
left solely to the decisions or whims of the President, in effect following 
the purpose of the War Powers Resolution.228 
In reincorporating Congress into the decision to use military force, the 
amendment should have clear language describing how Congress 
periodically assesses the decision and passes a budget for using military 
force.229  Congress is a barometer of the public feeling, and an amendment 
would reassert that Congress has to act as a proxy on behalf of the 
public.230  Therefore, an amendment would reinforce that Congress must 
periodically reaffirm, for the duration of the use of military force, that 
Congress supports this use of military force.231  Thus, Congress would 
actually act upon its power of the purse to affirm and spend for the use of 
                                                
226 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (making Congress the branch with the power to declare 
war); id. § 8, cl. 12 (granting Congress control of funding for military operations); U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces).  See also 
supra Part III.A (denoting that the history of the use of military force has focused on the use 
of war decided by both the Executive and Legislative Branches); supra Part II.A (outlining 
the history of the United States from the founding to the present day and outlining the 
previous practice of interbranch deliberations for the use of military force). 
227 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the interbranch decision to use military force); supra Part 
II.A (outlining the history of the United States from the founding to the present day and 
highlighting the interbranch practice of deliberating the use of military force from the 
founding until WWII). 
228 See supra note 214 (analyzing the failures of all three branches of government on the 
War Powers Resolution and the constitutional War Powers).  See also supra note 40 (noting 
the purpose of the War Powers Resolution to restore the use of the War Powers as envisioned 
by the constitutional Founders). 
229 See supra Part III (noting the problems of Congress and its abdication, including that 
Congress can tacitly approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department 
of Defense); supra note 187 (noting that the Congress continues to pass the budgets funding 
the use of military force, denoting tacit support for the use of military force). 
230 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 
302, 330–31 (1989)) (relating that state legislatures, and Congress as the head of the 
Legislative Branch, act theoretically as barometers of social mores and opinion). 
231 Cf. note 187 (indicating the degree of passivity upon which Congress can rely, tacitly 
approving military force via voting for budgets without actually and explicitly defending 
the use of military force). 
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military force.232  Moreover, Congress should also insist on how the 
money for military force has been spent.233 
One apparent problem in crafting a combination of a choke-chain and 
the Sword of Damocles is that it promotes encroachment between both the 
Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch.234  While some 
commentators, such as John Yoo, uphold a view of the Executive Branch 
as leading and deciding war, this amendment would give effect to the 
intent of the War Powers Resolution, which was to restore the decision of 
the use of the military force as an interbranch decision.235  Moreover, 
making the delegation to represent Congress in a lawsuit would also 
damper pure partisanship, which has tainted other litigation involving the 
War Powers.236 
Another problem which an amendment must solve is the lack of 
justiciability of the War Powers Resolution.237  As noted, the War Powers 
Resolution has proven to be the equivalent of dead-letter law, with 
various doctrines deployed by the courts to avoid deciding on the 
question of War Powers.238  In solving this question, the answer cannot be 
to allow just anyone to sue over war policy; instead, the standing should 
be restricted to a delegation from Congress, but within reason so as not to 
                                                
232 See supra note 218 (outlining the sections of the Analysis section indicating that neither 
the courts nor the other branches of government are the potential drivers for changing the 
current legal status of the War Powers and the underlying policy implications of that legal 
status); supra Part III.B.2 (outlining the problems related to Congress). 
233 Cf. Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (demonstrating the previous 
declarations of war which were public declarations by the Congress and nation). 
234 See supra Part III.B.3 (presenting an argument of Executive Branch overreach and 
problems resulting from interagency decisions regarding the use of military force).  See also 
supra note 40 (reporting the War Powers Resolution purpose to “[t]o fulfill the intent of the 
Farmers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of 
both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities”). 
235 See supra Part III.B.3 (presenting an argument of Executive Branch overreach and 
problems associated with solely interagency decisions regarding the use of military force).  
See also supra note 40 (reporting the purpose of the War Powers Resolution to “[i]t is the 
purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the Farmers of the Constitution of the 
United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President 
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities”). 
236 See supra Part III.B.1 (noting the problems associated with the standing problem with 
suits by Congress). 
237 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the various bars to litigation over the constitutional War 
Powers and the War Powers Resolution leading courts to dismiss all lawsuits which seek to 
litigate the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).  
238 See supra Part III.B.1 (referencing the analysis section and the problems of litigating the 
War Powers Resolution).  See also supra note 60 (noting that the War Powers Resolution is 
dead-letter law). 
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invite partisan rancor to overwhelm sober thought.239  Likewise, the 
President should also have standing to sue regarding the budgetary 
elements related to budgeting for military force.240 
Moreover, solving the justiciability issue addresses another 
problem.241  Constitutional amendments do not have elements that 
automatically enforce them; for instance, the Fourteenth Amendment 
states that Congress shall pass laws enabling the object of the 
amendment.242  The inclusion of the judiciary into the issue of military 
force provides an enforcement mechanism for the provisions of the 
proposed constitutional amendment, and prevents the amendment from 
being dead-letter law, a flaw with another proposed amendment. 243 
One other possibility is to include failure of the President to follow the 
amendment’s parameters as a cause for impeachment.244  While a major 
decision fraught with the possibility of government paralysis, such a 
decision would also add another edge to the amendment, because 
Congress would have a cause for action independent of the courts and the 
                                                
239 Cf. note 106 (noting that the Executive Branch takes advantage of dithering and 
abdication by Congress in the realm of war powers). 
240 Cf. note 239 (noting the problems of Congress, including that Congress can tacitly 
approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department of Defense).  See also 
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971) (remarking on continued 
Congressional funding as legitimizing Executive action and prosecution of the Vietnam 
War); supra note 188 (noting that the Congress continues to pass the budgets funding the use 
of military force, denoting tacit support for the use of military force). 
241 See supra Part III.C (referencing the analysis section dealing with the problem of 
litigating the War Powers Resolution and the problem of pursuing action via the courts and 
that courts dismiss all lawsuits litigating the War Powers and War Powers Resolution).  See 
also Elsea & Weed, Declarations of War, supra note 27 (containing the previous declarations of 
war which were public declarations by the Congress). 
242 See supra Part III.C (analyzing the problems related to amending the Constitution).  See 
also supra Part II.C.2 (presenting the background of amending the Constitution and the 
difficulty of such a feat because it requires a super-majority in both Congress and the 
individual states).  
243 See supra Part III (analyzing the War Powers and War Powers Resolution, leading to a 
conclusion that neither the courts nor the other branches of government are the drivers for 
changing the current legal status of the War Powers and the underlying policy implications 
of that legal status, and remarking specifically on the problems related to Congress, 
including partisanship and Congressional abdication).  See also Miksha, War Powers 
Resolution, supra note 47, at 690–93 (proposing a constitutional amendment to create a war 
council as a more consultative model for employing military force, but which lacked any 
enforcement language, relying on dicta from Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803) 
reading, “It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without 
effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it”).  
244 See supra Part III.B.3 (indicating the overreach of the Executive Branch and how the first 
AUMF enables the use of offensive military force beyond self-defense to be part of U.S. 
foreign policy).  But see supra note 200 (decrying the possibility of impeachment). 
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standing controversy associated with cases involving the War Powers.245  
Including a cause for impeachment would also serve as a way to modify 
presidential behavior, especially behavior associated with the various 
presidential dodges used to circumvent the reporting and consulting 
requirements of the War Powers Resolution.246  On the downside, this 
provision is also open to partisan abuse.247 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The current military policy of the United States is one of perpetual 
war.  Such a policy departs from U.S. traditions and the Constitution until 
the post-WWII world, where the decision to use military force 
transformed from an interbranch dialogue between the Executive and 
Legislative branches to an interagency decision in the Executive Branch.  
Such a policy is an aberration from previous understandings of Americans 
that war and peace were distinctive.  Peace rather than war was the 
natural state, and this aberration has had disastrous effects, warping U.S. 
foreign policy as well as causing ill domestic effects. 
In understanding the policy of perpetual war, the real question has 
been how the current legal status leads to the current U.S. policy.  The 
courts cannot rectify the problem, with various bars to litigation proving 
that lawsuits are not the solution.  Nor does it appear that the solution will 
emerge from a fractious or partisan Congress.  Similarly, the Executive 
Branch will not look a gift horse in the mouth by an abdicating Congress, 
whereby the Executive Branch makes using military force an interagency 
decision rather than an interbranch decision. 
Because the solution will not emerge from the three branches of 
government, the answer to the problem of perpetual war is instead a 
radical idea: a constitutional amendment.  This Note proposes a 
reworking of the War Powers within the Constitution to force interbranch 
deliberation on the use of military force, providing pathways for either the 
Executive Branch or Legislative Branch to compel compliance via lawsuit.  
                                                
245 See supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the problems related to litigating the War Powers and 
War Powers Resolution, including multiple bars to litigation meaning that all cases are 
dismissed resulting in the War Powers Resolution as dead-letter law). 
246 See supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problems of governance from the Legislative 
Branch, denoting that Congress has neither served as an effective counterweight nor has 
Congress amended the War Powers Resolution); supra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the problems 
of governance from the Executive Branch, denoting that the Executive Branch has continued 
its overreach based on Congressional abdication). 
247 See supra note 239 (noting the problems of Congress, including that Congress can tacitly 
approve military force by simply passing the budget for the Department of Defense, which 
was noted as a legitimization of Executive actions noted in Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 
1042–44 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
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The proposed amendment also obviates lawsuits like Captain Smith’s; 
while the courts dismissed Captain Smith’s lawsuit for lack of standing or 
political question, this proposed amendment empowers only Congress or 
the President to sue over military force.  The proposed amendment is not 
sublime perfection, but an attempt to restore the interbranch dialogue that 
the United States originally used for military action, providing a more 
sober military and foreign policy. 
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